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ABSTRACT
RACE, GENDER, AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
OVERCOMING OPPRESSION THROUGH THE THEATRE OF THE OPPRESSED
by Jacob Edward Rothschild
May 2014
A great deal of recent democratic political theory has revolved around the concept
of democratic deliberation. However, this brand of theory has neither fully addressed the
need for empathy between social groups in the deliberative process nor sufficiently
examined the consequences of its absence. Such intergroup empathy is a necessary
component of political communication that seeks to root out oppression in a liberal
democracy. This project begins with a review of the basic tenets of deliberative
democracy, as well as its most common challenges. +DEHUPDV¶WKHRU\RIV\VWHPDWLFDOO\
distorted communication is then explored, with intergroup empathy as a suggested
remedy. Gendered norms of deliberation, stereotypes, and double consciousness are
discussed as obstacles to the development of this empathy. Following this, the results of
a lack of empathy are examined through racialized public memory, the sexual contract,
and the concept of whiteness. Testimony, narrative, and rhetoric are then discussed as
prior attempts to develop empathy in political communication. Finally, this project
XWLOL]HV$XJXVWR%RDO¶V7KHDWUHRIWKH2SSUHVVHGWRLQFRUSRUDWHERWKWKHYLWDOHOHments of
deliberation and the communicative styles inherent in narrative, resulting in a more
productive and comprehensive intergroup empathy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The following anecdote recounting a Theatre of the Oppressed workshop begins
WKHSURORJXHWR$XJXVWR%RDO¶V Legislative Theatre:
³When Thespis invented the protagonLVWKHLQYHQWHGWKHPRQRORJXH´
said 7LPWKH-RNHU³Prior to this, everyone sang and danced ± they were on the
chorus. With Thespis, the monologue came into being: one person talking on his
own. When a person is speaking on their own or in the theatre, or anywhere else
for that matter, we call it monologue. Does everyone understand?´
Everyone had understood this clear, simple explanation. The Joker
continued the first lessonHQFRXUDJHGE\WKHUHVSRQVH³Then Aeschylus comes
along, the first Greek tragedian, and he invents the Deuteragonist, the second
actor. And when he added this second actor, he invented dialogue. So then, what
is dialogue?´
Silence. Tim wanted to encourage participation from the group in this
new workshop ± interactivity ± and he asked the question again, in greater detail:
³When one person is speaking on their own, that is a monologue, they are doing a
monologue. So what is a dialogue?´
More silence. The Joker resorted to vLVXDODLGV³A monologue is when
one person, a single person, LVWDONLQJRQKLVRUKHURZQ«´, and he held up the
inGH[ILQJHURIKLVULJKWKDQG³One person only!
6RGLDORJXHLV«"6RZKDWLVDGLDORJXH«"$GLDORJXHLVZKHQ«"´ And
this time he held up two fingers.
³,NQRZ,NQRZ´ answered one of the patients eagerly.
³6RWHOOXVZKDWLVGLDORJXH"´
³,W¶VZKHQWKHUHDUHWZRSHRSOHWDONLQJRQWKHLURZQ«´1
Humorous in its confusion, this story illustrates an experience that is likely quite familiar
to most people. We sometimes see two perfectly rational individuals speaking to one
another, but without any understanding developing between them. In a certain regard
such a scene more closely resembles two actors simultaneously performing monologues,
neither aware of the other, more than a conversation. For everyday matters, such a lack
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Augusto Boal, Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics, trans. Adrian Jackson (New
York: Routledge, 1998), eBook edition, 2-3.
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of understanding is fairly benign. However, for issues with strong political implications,
this failure to communicate can have strong negative consequences.
In particular, this phenomenon ought to trouble political theorists within the
tradition of deliberative democracy, theorists who rely on dialogue and debate between
engaged citizens. There are numerous similarities between this branch of democracy and
others, such as the belief in popular sovereignty and the guarantee of equality and
freedom. Where deliberative democratic theorists depart from others is with the
emphasis they place on the public use of reason as the means by which decisions
affecting public matters ought to be reached. Although the parameters of the deliberative
political society vary from author to author, which I will later discuss a bit more
thoroughly, each values the public exchange of reasons and viewpoints with the goal of
reaching a decision in a manner that is valid to all who participate. Vital to the
legitimacy of this procedure is the guarantee that only reasons expressed publicly in a free
and equal manner will affect the outcome of deliberation. Therefore, we must give
attention to a variety of other possible influences that might taint this process, some
easier to identify than others. Those who have investigated this issue already have
focused largely on preferred modes of expression, informal rules of who ought to speak
more or less, and an unintended silencing of minority viewpoints. While I certainly will
not deny the importance of these observations ± in fact I will outline them in more detail
later on ± I find that the literature on deliberative pitfalls is missing a crucial component.
Experiences of oppression, I argue, lead to gaps in understanding of social issues
between those who oppress and those who are oppressed. These gaps, in turn, show up
as flawed communication within the deliberative processes and require intergroup
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empathy as a solution. I will use the examples of racial oppression and gender
subordination to illustrate this idea. Ultimately, my goal is to build from prior literature
to build a more complete picture of the potential shortcomings of deliberative democracy.
This is not to reject deliberation altogether, but rather to fine-tune our understanding of
its assets, limitations, and applications. I aim to show that there is a certain kind of
knowledge that cannot be easily shared through traditional deliberation2 and also to
H[SORUH$XJXVWR%RDO¶VIRUXPWKHDWHUDVDW\SHRIGHOLEHUDWLRQWKDWFDQRYHUFRPHWKLV
challenge.
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³7UDGLWLRQDOGHOLEHUDWLRQ´LVDWHUPWKDW,ZLOOXVHWRGHVFULEHGHOLEHUDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSURFHGXUHVDQG
ideals laid out by deliberative theorists such as Habermas, Cohen, and Gutmann and Thompson, although I
will look to challenge this dominant conception later on in this work.
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CHAPTER II
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS OBSTACLES
In order to effectively critique deliberative democracy and attempt to remedy its
shortcomings, we must first understand its fundamentals. In this first chapter, I will
outline the basic tenets of deliberative democracy, as well as some common challenges to
its practice. Following this, I will offer my own expansion of these criticisms in order to
work toward a more comprehensive understanding of deliberation.
What is Deliberative Democracy?
To begin, it is important to have an understanding of deliberative democracy from
which this project may proceed. It may be helpful here to contrast deliberative theory
with another conceptualization of democracy. Aggregative democracy, the label given to
a variety of non-deliberative democratic theories, consists of a system in which citizens
express preferences, usually through voting, which are then held as the primary material
that officials ought to use in their decision-making processes.3 Such a process can be
quite attractive for a variety of reasons: First, this form of democracy may provide
representation of citizen interests in exchange for very little effort. Citizens must stay at
least minimally informed of things such as candidate positions and proposed policies;
however, stating RQH¶VSUHIHUHQFHVDQG interests requires little effort and expressing these
can be achieved with a simple punch of a ballot or pull of a lever. Second, aggregative
procedures refrain from attaching value judgments to policy preferences. Although
individuals may provide their own judgments, this is not an inherent part of any
aggregative democratic system. Finally, aggregative democracy has the advantage of
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The following summary of aggregative democracy is highly informed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 13-21.
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producing clear, determinate outcomes. Whether by a direct referendum or via
representation in a legislature, an exact aggregation of preferences has only one possible
formulation.
Although aggregative democracy clearly has its attractive points and was the
dominant democratic conception for most of the modern era, a large number of
democratic theorists remain skeptical of its value. While aggregative theories have their
merits, they do not require justification or defense of preferences. It may be helpful to
think of this formulation of democracy as similar to a marketplace; the demand for
certain policies and political outcomes dictates the behavior of elected officials, who
behave in the manner most likely to please the greatest number of their constituents.
Such a conception of democracy is unproblematic for some; however, many critics
contend that the logic that governs a capitalist marketplace is unsuitable for
implementation in the resolution of public disputes, even within a liberal capitalist
society. While certain preferences may translate easily into economic calculations, others
such as the health and well-being of the citizenry may not.
In response to such concerns and in contrast to aggregative democracy, theories of
deliberative democracy require a bit more of those who participate in the democratic
process. Instead of simply aggregating our preferences, deliberative democracy seeks to
establish a conversation involving these competing ideas, preferences, and values. Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson helpfully provide a definition of deliberative democracy,
JLYLQJWKDWQDPHWR³DIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQWLQZKLFKIUHHDQGHTXDOFLWL]HQV DQGWKHLU
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that
are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions
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WKDWDUHELQGLQJLQWKHSUHVHQWRQDOOFLWL]HQVEXWRSHQWRFKDOOHQJHLQWKHIXWXUH´4 By
looking at the various pieces of this definition, we can more fully understand what
deliberative democracy entails, the arguments in its favor, and its advantages over
aggregative democracy. First, and perhaps in greatest contrast to an aggregative model,
we see that proper political deliberation relies on reasons or arguments that all rational
citizens could accept. Gutmann and Thompson note that this aspect of deliberative
democracy has its roots in the traditional democratic notion that citizens of a democracy
ought to be treated as autonomous subjects, not simply objects to be ruled. Requiring
mutually acceptable reasons not only promotes justifiable decisions but also encourages
mutual respect between citizens.5 Moreover, reasons acceptable to all are more likely to
lead to policy outcomes oriented toward the common good; while aggregative theories
have no such requirement, most deliberative theories include some focus on the common
good, even though the scope varies between authors. Some theorists advocate a thin
conception of the common good, arguing that there is an unavoidable amount of
disagreement built into pluralist political life; the common good for these authors consists
largely in fair terms of cooperation. Others, by contrast, advocate a deeper conception of
the common good that requires citizens to engage each other over deep moral
differences.6
This reason-giving requirement of deliberative democracy has not only normative
value, but instrumental value as well. As many authors have noted,7 no individual citizen
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Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, 7.
Ibid., 3-4.
6
For a short discussion of these differences, see Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?,
26-29.
7
6HHIRUH[DPSOH6H\OD%HQKDELE³7RZDUGD'HOLEHUDWLYH0RGHORI'HPRFUDWLF/HJLWPDF\´LQ6H\OD
Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton
5
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can have access to all of the knowledge needed to make an informed decision on any
given topic, least of all in a complex, diverse society such as the contemporary United
States. Therefore, it is vital not only to express opinions or preferences but also to
convey why we hold them, in that this information is required for a deliberative body to
come to a properly informed decision.
Second, in addition to mutually acceptable reasons, deliberation must also exhibit
the qualities of publicity and accessibility, and there are a number of justifications for this
requirement. Perhaps most importantly, as argued by James Bohman, deliberation that is
public is likely to have superior epistemic quality; arguments that are subjected to the
whole range of opposing lines of thought will inevitably be stronger and more defensible.
However, this notion of publicity requires not only that deliberation be made available to
the public at large, but that reasons are communicated in ways that are understandable by
the general population.8 Overly technical or culturally-specific communication
undermines the legitimacy that is the goal of publicity, regardless of the content of that
communication.
Thirdly, while it may seem obvious, it is nonetheless important to note that
deliberative democracy is meant to be a form of government. Effective deliberation has
value in a variety of settings, including civic organizations and other non-public entities.
However, while this type of deliberation may be part of a greater public conversation that
is included in a deliberative democratic theory, the principles behind deliberative
democracy call for more than this ± namely, that there be some binding decisions
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
University Press, 1996), 71; and Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 125.
8
James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1996), 26-27.
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associated with deliberation. Just as importantly, the connections between deliberation
and governmental action ought to be readily apparent; the more easily citizens are able to
see these connections, the greater the legitimacy of the governing structure.9 Decisions
made through deliberation are not, however, permanent or immune to challenge. Another
central tenet of deliberative democracy is that past decisions are open to reinvestigation
and further discussion. As Seyla Benhabib notes, deliberative theory allows for a
³VHFRQGPHWDOHYHORIGLVFRXUVH´ in which the deliberative conditions that produce an
outcome may be examined;10 this deliberation about past deliberation allows us to
reexamine decisions at which we have previously arrived through the lens of new
information, ideas, and perspectives. A decision of a deliberative body is simply held to
be valid and legitimate until the process by which it was reached can be effectively
criticized.
Finally, the claim that those participating in a deliberative democracy ought to be
free and equal should be wholly uncontroversial and is not unique to deliberative models.
Liberty and equality have been the cornerstones of democratic theory from its
beginnings, so one would expect that deliberation would be required to adhere to those
principles. Democratic outcomes are largely evaluated on their degree of legitimacy;
inherent in the ideals of democracy is the notion that the policies and actions of the
government ought to represent the will of the public at large. Joshua Cohen states that
³IUHHDQGUHDVRQHGDJUHHPHQWDPRQJHTXDOV´LVWKHRQO\DYHQXHWRGHPRFUDWLF
OHJLWLPDF\DQGDUJXHVWKDWDSURSHUGHOLEHUDWLYHIUDPHZRUN³FDSWXUHVWKLVSULQFLSOH´11
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-RVKXD&RKHQ³'HOLEHUDWLRQDQG'HPRFUDWLF/HJLWLPDF\´LQ'HUHN0DWUDYHUVDQG-RQDWKDQ3LNHHGV
Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2002), 346.
10
Benhabib³7RZDUGD'HOLEHUDWLYH0RGHORI'HPRFUDWLF/HJLWPDF\´
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In a continuaWLRQRI&RKHQ¶Vthought, Benhabib argues that deliberation between free and
equal citizens is the only means by which democratic institutions may claim to represent
the interests of all citizens, which is the basis for legitimacy itself.12
However, while an ideal deliberative setting clearly ought to be characterized by
freedom and equality, the extent to which deliberation actually occurs under these
circumstances is contestable, and the ways in which these rights are denied ought to be
under constant investigation. Formal guarantees of free and equal status (whether
constitutionally guaranteed or included in deliberative guidelines) do not necessarily
carry over into practice, particularly in a pluralistic society characterized by various
forms of structural inequality. This aspect of deliberative theory will be the focus of my
project.
Exclusion in Deliberation
Perhaps an analogy will be useful in beginning our discussion of the obstacles to
free and equal deliberation. In his examination of English thought regarding the French
Revolution, Don Herzog introduces the scene of an 18th century English coffeehouse.
Observers of the day noted that, unlike the other scenarios in which individuals
occupying varying roles within the social hierarchy came into contact with one another,
WKHFRIIHHKRXVHZDVDSODFHLQZKLFKRQH¶VVRFLDOVWDWXVVHHPHGUHODWLYHO\PHDQLQJOHVV
Members of Parliament, artisans, and shopkeepers all gathered in such establishments
free from the ordinary customs, salutations, and social rules of engagement required in
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other settings.13 Herzog summarizes coffeehouse discussion, which he explains one 18th
century writer has called a masquerade, in this way:
[Y]es, you can figure out who is the noble lord, who the hapless artisan. But you
PXVWEOLQG\RXUVHOIWRWKDWIDFWEHFDXVHLW¶VLUUHOHYDQWLQWKLVFRQWH[W7KH03
must not presume on his status, say by trying to bully his interlocutors into meek
VXEPLVVLRQ«1RWWKDWWKHSOD\HUVDOZD\VREH\WKHUXOHVDQ\PRUHthan they do
in any other game.14
What we have, then, is a setting of (often political) discussion and debate that is
understood by its participants to operate under a presumption of equal standing,
regardless of status outside of its boundaries. How closely this understanding matches
reality, however, remains to be seen.
Later in his work, Herzog provides a discussion of condescension. Contrary to
the modern connotation, within the context of the 18th and 19th FHQWXULHV³FRQGHVFHQVLRQ
was a virtue, the act of a great man who graciously lowers himself to deal with inferiors
RQDIRRWLQJRIHTXDOLW\´15 We might question, however, whether an individual who
occupies a distinctly superior position within society can every truly place himself or
herself on equal footing with another. And indeed, in reference to an act of
FRQGHVFHQVLRQLQDQ(OL]DEHWK,QFKEDOG¶VSimple Story+HU]RJFODLPVWKDW³>W@KH
condescending man leaves behind his august status ± but not entirely. The equality he
creates remains partial, tentative, something like the as-if masquerade of [the
DIRUHPHQWLRQHG@FRIIHHKRXVH´16 %\HTXDWLQJWKHPDQIURP,QFKEDOG¶VVWRU\ZKRFDQQRW
quite abandon his superiority with the upper class individuals from the coffeehouse,
Herzog advances the argument that even the setting which was (at least implicitly)
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Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000),
140-141.
14
Ibid., 141-142.
15
Ibid., 206.
16
Ibid., 209.
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understood to be a haven of egalitarian discussion and debate could not completely be
purged of unequal social relations.
If we understand the coffeehouse to be analogous to a setting of political
deliberation, we can see how it would be difficult to attain the conditions needed to
ensure that deliberation would be free from oppressive social relationships. In the same
way that the political discussion taking place within the coffeehouse is plagued by the
social hierarchy that exists outside its walls, it seems unlikely that the formal rules by
which political deliberation is supposed to operate can negate the oppressive relationships
that exist in the other spheres of public and private life. Drawing a parallel between the
more prestigious members of British society and the dominant racial or gender group in a
GHPRFUDF\RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGEHWZHHQWKH³ORZHU´FODVVHVDQGa subordinated racial or
gender group on the other, will allow us to see clearly that there are likely to be power
relationships that do not disappear in the face of formal or informal rules of equality.
How is it then that political deliberation might fall short of the ideals of
deliberative theory? All liberal political societies are characterized by a variety of
inequalities (economic, educational, social, etc.), but there are certain areas ± such as
political partiFLSDWLRQDQGWKHDELOLW\WRKDYHRQH¶VYRLFHKHDUGLQWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV±
that liberal thinkers tend to believe should be outside the bounds of these inequalities.
Deliberative democratic theorists all accept this notion, arguing that each citizen has the
right (and often, even the obligation) to participate in political deliberation in one form or
another; however, authors tend to disagree on what is required of the deliberative setting
and process to ensure equal access and influence. Early deliberative theorists often
emphasized proper deliberative procedure: for such thinkers, proper rules and format for

12
deliberation ought to ensure equality within the process. Joshua Cohen, for example,
includes in his ideal deliberative procedure the requirement that the distribution of
resources and power in society have no bearing on the deliberative process. Each
participant has the right to raise topics, offer reasons, and vote if a consensus cannot be
reached.17 However, Cohen offers no explanation as to how we might ensure that each
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VSRLQWRIYLHZLVJLYHQHTXDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQE\RWKHUVRUZK\PHPEHUVRIWKH
dominant social group will not be able to more easily influence members of a deliberative
body with the reasons they give. While formal deliberative rules may guarantee the
opportunity to speak, they cannot negate the effects of social and psychological
conditioning.
The idea that some members of society will inevitably have greater sway over
others in deliberation predates any of the authors I have discussed so far. As he lays the
groundwork for a justifiable political society, Rousseau specifically eschews
intersubjective deliberation, favoring instead private consideration of political matters.
The goal of this personal deliberation is to discover the general will, which directs society
toward the common good. According to Rousseau:
If, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no
communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the
large number of small differences and the deliberation would always be good.
But when intrigues and partial associations come into being at the expense of the
large association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in
relation to its members and particular in relation to the state. It can be said,
then, that there are no longer as many voters as there are men, but merely as many
as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and yield a
result that is less general. Finally, when one of these associations is so large that
it dominates all the others, the result is no longer a sum of minor differences, but a
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single difference. Then there is no longer a general will, and the opinion that
dominates is merely a private opinion.18
5RXVVHDX¶VVXVSLFLRQRISXEOLFGHOLEHUDWLRQWKHQVWHPVIURPKLVFRQFHUQVUHJDUGLQJWKH
influences that some citizens may have over others; as the populace discusses issues
among itself and factions begin to develop, inevitably certain factions representing partial
interests will dominate others. The result of this process is not a society guided by the
general will/common good, but rather a society directed by the interests of the dominant
faction(s).
While this private deliberation may serve its intended purpose in the ideal society
Rousseau designs, it is unlikely to fit well within a contemporary liberal democracy. One
reason why Rousseau is able to suggest this style of politics is that he severely limits the
types of differences that can exist between his citizens. Near-total economic equality and
a rHTXLUHPHQWRIEHOLHILQD³FLYLO UHOLJLRQ´19 are among the features of this polity that
lead to a highly homogenous population; by contrast, inequalities and differences of all
sorts in contemporary democracies ± particularly the United States ± require
communication about political issues in order to make informed and inclusive decisions.
Considering the principle of tolerance of difference that is held in high regard in (most
RI WKHVHSROLWLHV5RXVVHDX¶VUHVWULFWLYHFRQGLWLRQVWKDWDOORZ for private deliberation to
be effective are likely to be unattractive. While this leads some to declare that a
participatory deliberative democracy is an unattainable utopia, many others are unwilling
to concede this point.20 The challenge, then, is how to allow for public deliberation while
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1987), 156.
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Ibid., 226.
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Bohman, Public Deliberation, 71-72.
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at the same time protecting against the unjust influence of partial interests that drives
5RXVVHDX¶VVNHSWLFLVP
To their credit, deliberative theorists have not left this problem unaddressed.
Bohman, for example, acknowledges the inadequacy of any deliberative theory that relies
RQLGHDOSURFHGXUHV³ZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRWKHVRFLDOFRQGLWLRQVLQZKLFKVXFKSURFHGXUHV
RSHUDWH´21 As mentioned above, inequalities that exist in society are expected to remain
outside of the process of political deliberation. Bohman recognizes here that one must
take into account specific information about the society in which the deliberation takes
place in order to achieve such a goal. For this author, a sort of litmus test for deliberative
equality is whether or not a citizen or group of citizens is able to initiate public discourse
about an issue of concern. Without this ability, compliance with political outcomes is
based not upon democratic legitimacy but rather on non-public reasons; many individuals
or groups who are excluded from the process of raising topics for deliberation simply
cannot afford non-compliance, or face consequences if they choose it.22 Consider the
homeless population of a large city, for example. This group as a whole is likely to be
unable to initiate public discussion of their conditions, but these individuals face
detention if they choose not to comply with laws concerning panhandling or loitering.
However, many authors (including Bohman himself) have recognized that even if
an issue of concern to a socially, economically, or politically disadvantaged group makes
it onto the agenda for deliberation, there is a multitude of means through which inequality
can manifest itself during the deliberative process itself. This challenge has led Iris
Marion Young to distinguish between external and internal exclusion. External
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exclusion, she writes, includes the ways in which individuals or groups are left out of the
deliberative process altogether. This type of exclusion characterizes the experiences of
those who do not have the ability to initiate discourse that I describe above. Internal
exclusion, by contrast, applies to those who are formally included in political deliberation
but find their claims taken less seriously, their modes of expression deemed inadequate,
or their experiences discounted.23
So how does this internal exclusion take place? To begin with, some have argued
that the norms of expression in traditional deliberative democracy such as calm,
straightforward argumentation, possess certain cultural biases; for example, Young notes
WKDWWKH³DUWLFXODWHQHVV´ZKLFKLVVRKLJKO\YDOXHGLQGHOLberation characterized by
reason-giving privileges a certain kind of educated citizen, who is more likely to come
from some groups than others, and more likely to be concerned with certain types of
issues.24 To the same effect, traditional deliberation that privileges dispassionate speech
disadvantages and excludes those individuals who might favor more emotional
expression. For this reason, Young criticizes what she deems a false dichotomy between
reason and emotion, favoring deliberation that allows for both simultaneously.25 The
reintegration of reason and emotion will be important to the later stages of my project
where I discuss the powerful effects of emotion not only to include a wider variety of
expressive styles, but also to help bridge gaps in experience, empathy, and understanding.
Internal exclusion may also arise as an unintended consequence of the goal of
seeking a common good, which is a component of many deliberative theories, and this
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has led to considerable disagreement regarding the extent to which we ought to privilege
XQLW\LQGHOLEHUDWLRQ/\QQ6DQGHUVIRUH[DPSOHKDVVWDWHGWKDW³GHPDQGLQJKRQRURID
higher value than oneself [i.e., the common good] can also work to discredit social
movements forged around the particular interests of RSSUHVVHGJURXSV´26 Young echoes
this notion, arguing that too strong an emphasis on the common good can often result in
pressure on oppressed or disadvantaged groups to suspend their demands for justice.27
Although deliberation is meant to be guided by notions of the common good, it is hard to
see how the common good is achieved when deliberation fails to meet the needs of an
entire social group. As Jane Mansbridge explains, when we rule out claims of selfinterest it becomes difficult for participants WRWUXO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHSURFHHGLQJVDQG³WKH
OHVVSRZHUIXOPD\QRWILQGZD\VWRGLVFRYHUWKDWWKHSUHYDLOLQJVHQVHRIµZH¶GRHVQRW
DGHTXDWHO\LQFOXGHWKHP´28
While addressing the forms of internal exclusion described above is undoubtedly
vital to the legitimacy of democratic procedures, threats to this legitimacy may remain
even if participants respect all styles of communication, do not suppress minority
concerns in pursuit of the common good, and all have the same opportunities to speak.
Because deliberative theory so highly values not only equal opportunity of participation
but also the assurance that all perspectives will be given due consideration, gaps in
understanding between participants that prevent or impede such consideration undermine
the possibility of the deliberative process adequately addressing all issues and concerns.
More specifically, I argue that experiences of oppression and domination (both explicit
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and covert) result in divergent fundamental understandings of political and social issues
related to the experiences of those oppressed groups. One way that I will argue this
KDSSHQVLVWKURXJK-UJHQ+DEHUPDV¶QRWLRQRIV\VWHPDWLFDOO\GLVWRUWHG
communication.29 Through the theory developed by Habermas, the comments on this
WKHRU\RIIHUHGE\-DPHV%RKPDQDQGP\RZQH[WHQVLRQDQGPRGLILFDWLRQRI%RKPDQ¶V
ideas, I will describe the process by which divergent understandings possessed by
dominated and dominating groups prevent the achievement of deliberative goals.
Distorted Communication
Even before deliberative democracy became so prominent in the field of political
theory over the last few decades, Jürgen Habermas was already considering the ways in
which political communication might fail in the process of genuine and free will
formation. According to Habermas, mere miscommunication is something that we can
remedy through normal communication by identifying the point at which our
understanding breaks down, determining what it is that we do not know, and working to
fill in the gaps. However, potentially more problematic are the situations in which
³>S@VHXGR-communication produces a system of reciprocal misunderstandings which, due
WRWKHIDOVHDVVXPSWLRQRIFRQVHQVXVDUHQRWUHFRJQL]HGDVVXFK´30 This specific type of
misunderstanding, according to Habermas, occurs when ³DWOHDVWone of the participants is
deceiving himself or herself regarding the fact that he or she is behaving strategically,
while he or she has only apparently adopted an attitude toward reaching
understanding.´31 :KLOH+DEHUPDV¶FRQFHSWLRQRIVXFFHVVIXOFRPPXQLFDWLRQLQYROYHV
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two parties seeking understanding, in systematically distorted communication one or
more of these individuals believes themselves to be seeking understanding, while they are
actually motivated by egocentric calculations.32 Only a neutral observer can recognize
WKDWGHVSLWHWKHFRPPXQLFDWLQJSDUWLHV¶EHOLHIWKDWWKH\XQGHUVWDQGRQHDQRWKHUWKH\DUH
in fact miscommunicating. However, because we are all inevitably situated within the
VDPHODUJHUFRPPXQLFDWLYHSURFHVVHVRQH¶VVWDWXVDVDSDUWLFLSDQWSUHFOXGHVKis or her
presence as a neutral observer.33 In other words, according to Habermas, any hidden
reciprocal misunderstandings active in public communication ± disguised as complete
understanding and consensus ± will be difficult to identify due to our situation within
those misunderstandings.
As Bohman explains, although distortions in communication might seem to
always be the product of manipulative behavior, this is not always the case. This
condition would seem to imply that distorted communication requires malicious intent in
order to take effect, a notion which Bohman rightly rejects. As he explains:
[Conscious power-seeking] need not be present in cases in which power is
PDLQWDLQHGWKURXJKXQHTXDOFDSDFLWLHV´$GGLWLRQDOO\JLYHQ³VWUXFWXUDO
restrictions in communication´« reasons can produce agreement that would not
be accepted under the conditions of publicity [discussed above]. In this way,
distorted communication can still make possible the consensus necessary for
further cooperation and participation, without coercion and fraud.34
Here, Bohman taps into the idea that distorted communication can aide in the
maintenance of the status quo and power relationships in the public sphere not only in
ways that are results of purposeful power-seeking, but are also unintentional and
unknown to those who participate in the communication. Consensus that may
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disadvantage certain citizens is maintained, without either the dominated or subordinated
group truly being aware of the underlying processes.35
So far, I have laid out the arguments coming from Habermas and Bohman which
seem to identify a potential problem for democratic deliberation: if there is a consensus
in society on any given idea that happens to disadvantage a certain group, or violates the
condition of freedom or equality, it would seem difficult to identify and rectify this
problem through deliberation. If consensus seems to exists, paradigms and the status quo
go unchallenged; if the distortion in communication leads to injustice in the public realm,
but nobody is able to see it, the issue is unlikely to make its way to the agenda for
deliberation.
Here is where I depart from Habermas, and possibly Bohman. It seems unclear to
whom and under what conditions Bohman believes these distortions become apparent.
Regardless, it seems illogical to assume that a societal consensus on any given issue
which disadvantages a certain group (or groups) of citizens would remain stable for very
long. Instead, consider the likelihood that the disadvantaged group will, over time,
identify the ways in which agreements are reached through this process. As Young
argues, commXQLFDWLRQPD\EHGLVWRUWHGWKURXJK³UKHWRULFWKDWSUHVHQWVDVXQLYHUVDOD
SHUVSHFWLYHRQH[SHULHQFHRUVRFLHW\GHULYHGIURPDVSHFLILFVRFLDOSRVLWLRQ´EXWDFtivists
will eventually begin to challHQJHVXFK³KHJHPRQLFGLVFRXUVHV´36 as the strategic action
of dominant groups becomes apparent to subordinated ones. Support for a similar
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argument can be found in $QWRQLR*UDPVFL¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUROHRILQWHOOHFWXDOV
Among the requisites for challenging the dominant ideology and promoting a new
conception of the world, he argues, is the development of the development and
elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in the members of a certain group.37
:KLOH*UDPVFL¶Vultimate goal is a Marxist state, we do not need to share his desired ends
to understand that, over time, a non-dominant group can develop a discourse that reflects
their experiences and challenges the status quo.
To put this more concretely in terms of my current project, an ideological
consensus may arise between an oppressed group and their oppressors. However, it is
unlikely that, regarding issues related to experiences of oppression, this consensus will
hold for an unlimited period of time. Instead, through their direct experiences of how
dominant understandings of societal structures disadvantage them, the subordinate group
will identify and begin to attempt to communicate to others the ways in which their
oppression is perpetuated.
This realization, however, leads to a different problem for deliberation. Instead
of, as Habermas proposes, a false consensus based on miscommunication, there can be a
fundamental gap in the understandings possessed by various groups. While the
experiences of the subordinated group lead to a greater understanding of how a prior
consensus ± as well as the way the associated ideas are framed and communicated in
public discourse ± creates disadvantages in violation of democratic norms, this
understanding is not available to the dominant groups, no matter how good their
intentions might be. As a result, the dominant group in society is unable to see the effects
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of their self-interested strategic action. This knowledge barrier is particularly
problematic for democratic deliberation because such deliberation hinges on a starting
place on which all participants can agree. $V%RKPDQVWDWHVGHOLEHUDWLRQLV³DSURFHVV
that must begin with a shDUHGGHILQLWLRQRIWKHSUREOHP´38 Critically, the ability to see
how a consensus functions to disadvantage certain citizens comes from the oppressive
experiences faced by these subjected groups. Therefore, this understanding is not
accessible to those who are not disadvantaged through the dominant ideology, creating a
fundamental misunderstanding with regard to the implications of a prior ideological
consensus.
To better understand this communicative impasse, I would like to take a detour
through the work of Paulo Freire. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire pushes for the
GHYHORSPHQWRI³FULWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV´DKHLJKWHQHGDZDUHQHVVLQDQRSSUHVVHGJURXS
of the social and political conditions that lead to the oppression faced by that particular
group.39 Such consciousness is what then allows these individuals to realize how the
structure of society disadvantages them, assert their interests, and begin to challenge the
oppressive system.40 However, this critical consciousness is dependent upon the
experience of being oppressed to begin with, and is unlikely to arise without such an
H[SHULHQFH)UHLUHDUJXHVWKDW³>I@RUVRPHRQHWRDFKLHYHFULWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIKLV
status as an oppressed man requires recognition of his reality as an oppressive reality.´41
With this in mind, it becomes a bit clearer why the understanding that results from
oppression cannot be fully communicated through deliberative reason-exchange. While
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participants may provide information to one another and give some perspective on the
experiences they have had, no amount of dialogue can be a proper substitute for a
burgeoning awareness of the oppressive conditions under which one lives. This is not to
say that it is impossible to be empathetic without firsthand experience; rather, I argue that
deliberation that emphasizes calm discourse and discourages emotional exchange is
unlikely to foster this empathy, which I discuss below.
Of course, Freire views a specific education as necessary for the full development
of critical consciousness, and I believe he is correct on this point.42 I would, however,
like to suggest that as this consciousness arises through education or other means, in
order to effect change we must ± if we are committed to democratic principles and
procedures ± have opportunities for the knowledge realized through this consciousness to
be communicated to the general public. Despite its promise for expanding democracy in
other ways, deliberation as conceived by Cohen, Gutmann, and others is ill-suited to this
type of task. This is certainly not to say that well-intentioned individuals from nonsubordinated groups cannot be persuaded by logic and argumentation that social change
is necessary; exposure to new facts and ideas can often pave the way to a change in
political outlooks. However, we must maintain a distinction between advocacy for
change and true understanding ± between sympathy and empathy. While sympathy to the
plights of others is admirable and often necessary for change, systemic and lasting change
requires an empathy not cultivated by argumentation. As Young points out, in order to
³PDNHMXGJHPHQWVZLWKSUDJPDWLFFRQVHTXHQFHVSROLWLFDOSXEOLFVPXVWQRWRQO\EHOLHYH
and accept claims and arguments, but also care about and commit their will to the
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outcomes´43 Of course, having empathy toward a group does not bind one to any
particular policy position. ³:KDWHPSDWK\SURPRWHVLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\DJUHHPHQW´
DUJXHV0LFKDHO0RUUHOO³EXWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLPSDFWVDGHFLVLRQZLOOKDYHRQRWKHUV´44
Because a certain understanding of oppression must be accessed at least in part through
the experiences of that oppression, the empathy necessary to understand those
experiences is a necessary component of political communication that seeks to promote
social justice.
To understand why traditional deliberation is not well-suited to engendering
empathy, it is important to see the roots that deliberative theory has in the Enlightenment.
In his essay on enlightenment itself, Kant asserts that in order for a public to enlighten
LWVHOIHDFKLQGLYLGXDOPXVWEHDOORZHGWRXVHRQH¶VRZQUHDVRQDQGQRWUHO\RQWKHUHDVRQ
of another.45 7KLVLQWXUQUHTXLUHVWKDWRQHUHWDLQVWKH³IUHHGRPWRPDNHpublic use of
RQH¶VUHDVRQLQDOOPDWWHUV´46 Importantly, to retain the autonomy that Kant sees as
requisite to enlightenment, the Kantian tradition maintains that we must not allow
rhetorical techniques in RXUGHOLEHUDWLRQ-RKQ2¶1HLOOWUDFHVWKLVEHOLHIEDFNWR3ODWR¶V
assertion that rhetoric works not toward learning, but toward conviction. Because
rhetoric relies on illusion instead of reason, its use violates the requirement of an
DXWRQRPRXVUHOLDQFHRQRQH¶VRZQUHDVRQDQGLVWKHUHIRUHXQVXLWDEOHIRUGHOLEHUDWLRQ
This anti-rhetorical stance has been adopted by neo-Kantians such as Habermas and
Rawls, which explains why deliberative theory has regularly rejected appeals to
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emotion.47 However, it is precisely through alternative communicative methods such as
UKHWRULFWKDWZHPD\HQJDJHHDFKRWKHU¶VHPRWLRQVWRcreate empathy. In this way,
deliberation seems unable to bridge the gap in understanding that results from
experiences of oppression. I will revisit the connections between emotion, empathy, and
gaps in understanding in Chapter IV.
To summarize, distorted communication consists of the creation of an ideological
consensus that disadvantages a particular social group. At some point, such a consensus
breaks down as members of the oppressed group develop and articulates an awareness of
how that consensus maintains their subjugation. However, because the consensus has
represented the truth to the dominant group, which does not have access to the
experiences of the oppressed counterpart, it is difficult for this group to understand an
opposing perspective. An understanding of this kind requires empathy, which traditional
deliberation is not well-suited to generating.
I should take care to make clear that the criticisms of deliberation that I offer in
this project are neither meant to suggest that political deliberation cannot have positive
results nor to question the motives of those who participate. My goals instead are to
better understand how oppressive relations may be reproduced even in the absence of
hostility and over prejudice, and to help expand the conception of deliberation in order to
address this problem. I will revisit this latter point in the final chapter; here, I would like
to address the former.
We should not assume that deliberators coming from traditionally powerful social
groups have malicious or oppressive intentions toward those generally considered to be
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less powerful or subordinate in the power structure; as discussed above, Bohman has
convincingly argued that intentions of power-seeking need are not necessary for the
distortion of communication. I also take it as a given that those who are willing to
deliberate with citizens from whom they are somehow different are committed (to some
substantial extent) to deliberative ideals ± including, but not limited to, free exchange of
reasons, equal opportunity of participation, and justice for all social groups. Of course, a
substantial number of citizens of democratic polities exist who do not conform to these
standards. Commitment to democratic ideas is by no means guaranteed, and some
writers have spent a considerable amount of time thinking about the possibilities of
instilling democratic values and competence through education.48 These types of
questions are undoubtedly important, and clearly no democracy or deliberative setting
can live up to its principles without a body of citizens that is committed to those
principles. However, a different and potentially more difficult question to answer is of
how oppressive relationships reproduce themselves in deliberation despite commitments
to deliberative ideals and positive intentions of fair and just procedures. Again, this does

not require any specific commitments to certain policy stances or political viewpoints,
but only a commitment to not actively suppressing the reasons and viewpoints of other
participants.
Indeed, we can see examples of deliberation where citizens who have no obvious
prejudices or malicious intentions against a group nevertheless make biased judgments.
Tali Mendelberg and John Oleske provide an example of this in their study of town hall
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meetings regarding the creation of racially integrated school districts in New Jersey.
While the black citizens of the area explicitly called for racial justice in the form of
integrating these districts, many of the white citizens rejected these calls, mistakenly
viewing the issue as non-racial. While these individuals centered their discussion around
the common good, they failed to see the racialized nature of the collective.49 I will revisit
these observations in greater detail in the next chapter. It is helpful here, though, to view
this account alongside the findings of Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth, who
examine the influence of race on the decision-making of jurors.50 In a perhaps counterintuitive finding, Sommers and Ellsworth show that jurors make more racially-biased
decisions when these jurors have not been in some way primed to think about race during
their deliberations.51
I see, then, two possible ways to reconcile these findings with the descriptions of
the town hall meetings given by Mendelberg and Oleske. One possibility is that the
white citizens participating in the town hall meetings are not committed or indifferent to
racial egalitarianism. While this is certainly a possibility for some, a more likely
explanation is that many of the white citizens are unaware that race is in fact a very real
factor in their situation, unaware of the racialized public order that the black citizens are
able to see. We can extrapolate from the findings of Sommers and Ellsworth to infer that
if the whites involved in these town meetings were aware of the role played by race in the
dispute, they would be likely (although not guaranteed) to process reasons and arguments
differently, and therefore make different judgments about what would be a just course of
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action. The question, then, is of how to begin to close this type of gap in understanding
during deliberation, a challenge to which I will return in the final chapter.
It might not be immediately clear thus far why a gap in understanding will
necessarily disadvantage the oppressed social group and never the dominant group.
Indeed, it might seem as though, armed with a greater knowledge and understanding of
the social structure resulting from their experiences, an oppressed group would actually
be more effective in deliberative settings as a better-informed group of individuals.
However, this argument overlooks the fact that a gap in understanding will inevitably
favor the status quo. If the reasons and perspectives provided by a historically subjugated
group are not perceived as valid due to this type of communicative barrier, they cannot
help a public to address the societal conditions that continue to disadvantage certain
groups. I borrow here from Bohman, who writes that when we fail to consider reasons
provided by all³GHOLEHUDWLRQDGRSWVWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKHGRPLQDQWJURXSUDWKHUWKDQ
shifting among the richer set of perspectives of all those concerned. Other mechanisms
of deliberative uptake similarly become limited, as when a norm is interpreted through
the particular application favored by a powerful group.´52 As the status quo inevitably
favors the historically dominant social group and its understanding of social and political
problems (if this group even recognizes that a problem exists), gaps in understanding will
limit the ability of an oppressed group to address its needs through the deliberative
process.
One might stop me here, however, and assert that we need not look outside of the
confines of the deliberative structure to address divergent understandings that result from
oppressive experiences. Indeed, one could argue, public deliberation is exactly the
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setting in which we can exchange the information and insights that eventually lead to
more informed and reasonable political outcomes. If we all understood the reasons and
possessed the information held by every other citizen, we would not need to deliberate in
the first place. While this is true in many regards and public deliberation offers a unique
setting in which citizens may exchange reasons and information to expand the public
consciousness, I contend that there are certain types of knowledge that cannot be easily
communicated through logic, reason, or unimpassioned speech, but are in fact created
through experiences of oppression.
It is also important to recognize that public deliberation which does not
adequately take into account the beliefs and viewpoints of a subordinated group is not
only detrimental to the well-being of that particular group, but to the public as a whole. It
is through communication across contrasting perspectives that alORZV³HDFKSDUWLFLSDQWWR
understand more of what the society means or what the possible consequences of a policy
will be by each situating his or her own experience and interest in a wider context of
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRPHWKLQJLQRWKHUVRFLDOORFDWLRQV´53 As Katherine Cramer Walsh
H[SODLQV+DQQDK$UHQGWFRQVLGHUHGLQWHUDFWLRQDPRQJPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLFDV³WKH
SUDFWLFHE\ZKLFKSHRSOHFUHDWHµWKHSXEOLF¶´54 It is through a collective process of
deliberation and civic engagement, not a simple aggregation of interests and values, that
ZHJLYHPHDQLQJDQGVXEVWDQFHWRSXEOLFOLIH:DOVKSURYLGHVDQH[SODQDWLRQRI$UHQGW¶V
claim:
Imagine for a moment an object. People, being the unique individuals that we
are, each have a particular perspective of this oEMHFW7R$UHQGWLQGLYLGXDOV¶
unique perspectives function like lights to collectively illuminate the objects of
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our attention. If the object we are focusing on is a sphere, for example, in private
our individual lights allow us to see part of this sphere. But in a public realm,
something transformative happens: multiple people, all shining their individual
lights on this object, reveal a depth and richness to it that is not visible to an
individual viewing it alone.55
If we understand the creation of the public consciousness to take place in the manner
described above, it should be clear that the exclusion of minority viewpoints and
experiences is likely to leave a hole in that consciousness, whether this exclusion is
formal or a result of power structures and oppressive relationships that work their way
into the process of political deliberation. This statement is especially true if the object in
question is a public understanding of the effects of race, gender, or social domination of
any other kind. When the experiences, reasons, and arguments of a subordinated group
are excluded from the deliberative process as a result of a gap in experiences and
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIVRFLHW\¶VVWUXFWXUHWKHSXEOLFDWODUJHGHSULYHVLWVHOIRIWKHIXOOHVW
possible self-awareness, an awareness without which it cannot fully account for the rights
of any of its citizens.
Furthermore, the perspectives of subordinated groups can contribute something in
particular that those of the dominant groups cannot. In his early work entitled The Souls

of Black Folk, W. E. B. Du Bois writes:
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teutonic and
Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world, ± a world which yields him no true selfconsciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world.56
Using this passage as evidence, Robert Gooding-Williams explains that the experiences
that are coupled with existing as an AfULFDQ$PHULFDQLQ'X%RLV¶YLHZDOORZRQHWRVHH
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something that those in the dominant group cannot. Such an individual sees the world
through the perspective of his or her own group but also through the lens of the dominant
racial group. This duality provides the ability of the African American to experience the
world from the point of view of a different social group.57 As a result, second sight
SURYLGHVVRPHWKLQJLQYDOXDEOHQDPHO\³WKHFDSDFLW\WRFRQYH\«WKHSDUWLDOLW\RIDOO
SHUVSHFWLYHV´58 Although Du Bois and Gooding-Williams write about the experiences of
African Americans in the United States, we can comfortably assume that this second
sight would manifest in some form for any subordinated social group. Therefore, when
these perspectives are not given full consideration in deliberation, a valuable resource for
bridging gaps in perspectives is lost.
In order to demonstrate more concretely how the concepts I have described above
manifest themselves in society, I will discuss in the following chapters how deliberative
norms and divergent understandings of political and social issues can prevent the
realization of deliberative ideals. So far, I have demonstrated the need for empathy in
political communication to bridge gaps in understanding. My second chapter will
examine the challenges that perceptions of deliberative participants pose to empathy in
deliberation. In the third chapter, I will look at the ways in which the dominant
understandings of race and gender also impede the development of empathy. My fourth
and final chapter will review and supplement some familiar challenges to the rejection of
emotion in political deliberation, arguing that such a separation of reason and emotion is
not only exclusive, but illogical to begin with. To expand our understanding of what
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proper deliberation may entail, I will utilize a rarely-tapped resource in political theory,
$XJXVWR%RDO¶Vinnovative methods of political theater. Viewed as a synthesis of
deliberation and other innovative forms of communication, his ideas will help to
construct a more inclusive deliberative theory ± one that is better suited to fostering
empathy across social groups.
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CHAPTER III
PERCEPTIONS, STEREOTYPES, AND DELIBERATIVE NORMS
In the previous chapter, I briefly described ways in which deliberation may fail to
meet its theoretical ideals due to a lack of empathy for oppressed social groups. In the
following two chapters, I will expand upon these concepts and apply them more
concretely to problems faced by specific groups. In a piece detailing a number of pitfalls
in deliberation, Lynn Sanders notes the differentials in power and influence between
dominant and subordinated racial and gender groups in deliberative contexts.59 She
writes that the level of abstraction reached by many deliberative theorists construes
deliberative citizens as raceless, classless, and genderless, taking the time to show that
these variances in personal characteristics actually have strong real-world implications
regarding who has what kind of influence in the process of deliberation.60 In the
following pages, I will focus on and expand upon Sanders¶ observations about the effects
of how deliberative participants perceive each other and themselves. In addition to
reviewing the well-known issues raised by feminist critiques, I will apply the concepts of
stereotypes and double consciousness to challenge deliberative assumptions. Through
examining these theories, I will show that the field of deliberative democratic theory has
much to resolve with regard to personal perceptions for deliberation to be appropriately
empathetic.
Gendered Norms of Participation
A substantial amount of attention has already been devoted to the internal
exclusion of women in deliberation. Here I review the most prominent of concerns raised
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in previous writing. Some are unique to the experience of women in a liberal democracy,
while others can be applied to oppressed groups more broadly. It is important for one to
see the vast array of challenges facing women in deliberative settings, not limiting
oneself to one particular aspect, in order to fully understand how exclusive deliberation
FDQEH$GGLWLRQDOO\VXFKDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³KHOS>V@XVto grasp other forms of
domination, such as those based on wealth, that can also affect the deliberative
SURFHVV´61 More importantly for this project, these norms prevent the recognition and
respect of non-dominant viewpoints that is necessary to foster empathy in deliberation.
To begin, feminine speech itself is often considered to be less welcome in
political deliberation. This is not to say that women are expressly prohibited or
discouraged from participating in such an environment; rather, many argue that the norms
of deliberation favor what is thought of as more masculine speech. As discussed in the
previous chapter, deliberation that so highly values political decision-making via rational
argumentation and a logical progression of ideas similarly devalues speech that is
emotional. Just as with racial minorities, women are often perceived to express
themselves in more the latter style than the former. Whereas men tend to be more
controlled in their speech, argues Young, women are taken less seriously in deliberation
DVWKHLU³H[SUHVVLRQVRIDQJHUKXUWDQGSDVVLRQDWHFRQFHUQGLVFRXQWWKHFODLPVDQG
UHDVRQVWKH\DFFRPSDQ\´62
Although once accepted at face value, some have begun to question whether
women are truly more emotional in their deliberative expression than men. One
particular study that would seem to undermine this critique, performed by Andrea
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Hickerson and John Gastil, examines the experience of emotion in jury deliberations.
Contrary to the assumptions of much prior research, the authors conclude that a
substantial majority of both men and women in their study found emotion to be an
important part of their experiences as jurors, with only a marginal difference between the
two sexes.63 If emotion is integral to deliberation for both men and women, then perhaps
the norm of calm and rational expression does not disadvantage women in the way some
have argued. However, the fact that both sexes experience emotion during deliberation
(which should not come as a surprise) says nothing about how emotional expression is
LQWHUSUHWHGE\RWKHUV2QH¶VRZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRQH¶VH[SUHVVLRQPDWWHUVIDUOHVVWR
the outcomes of deliberation than does the way in which others perceive it.
For this reason, research on the influence of emotional expression is pertinent to
the discussion of the status of women in deliberation. Jessica Salerno explores this very
topic, using computer-mediated mock jury trials where each participant is faced with one
holdout juror holding the opposite verdict preference. Participants were faced with both
male and female holdout jurors, who expressed their opinions either with or without
emotion. While a holdout male juror who expressed anger lowered a participDQW¶V
confidence in their opinion, the same expression from a female holdout juror resulted in

higher FRQILGHQFHLQRQH¶VSULRURSLQLRQ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIDFHUWDLQ
emotion by a man caused participants to rethink their positions, while the same emotional
expression by a woman left one more sure of their position than before.64 These findings
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suggest a potentially different form of exclusion. Prior challenges to deliberative
democracy have claimed that women are internally excluded because the norms of
GHOLEHUDWLRQIDYRUSUHGRPLQDQWO\PDOHVSHDNLQJVW\OHV+RZHYHU6DOHUQR¶VVWXG\
suggests not that women are particularly more emotional in deliberative settings, but
rather that feminine emotion has a different effect on fellow participants than masculine
emotion, at least when such emotion is expressed by one of the minority opinion.
Salerno suggests that this phenomenon results from the fact that anger, as opposed to
fear, is seen as a primarily masculine emotion; deliberative participants unconsciously
³SHQDOL]H´ZRPHQZKRH[SUHVVQRQ-stereotypical emotions.65 Though I do not mean to
doubt this conclusion, I would like to offer an additional interpretation. It seems as
though when a male in the minority opinion expresses anger, his emotion is experienced
E\RWKHUVDVDQDGGLWLRQDOIDFHWRUVXSSRUWRIKLVUDWLRQDODUJXPHQW$ZRPDQ¶VDQJHURQ
the other hand, appears to stand as a substitute for her reason, rendering her argument less
convincing and less acceptable as part of reasoned public deliberation. Whatever the
mechanism, the fact remains that women may find themselves disadvantaged in
deliberation when their emotionality is perceived as irrational. While prior empirical
research showing that both men and women use emotion in deliberation has sought to
GLVFUHGLWFULWLTXHVEDVHGDURXQGHPRWLRQDOLW\6DOHUQR¶VUHVHDUFKVKRZVWKDW
demonstrating the presence of emotion in the communication of both sexes is not
sufficient to do away with such criticism. Because this seems especially true for a female
minority, those seeking to address difficult gender issues through deliberation will likely
find it difficult to be taken seriously.
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Women may also find themselves disadvantaged through the roles that they are
given or select for themselves in a deliberative setting. For example, Sanders notes that
men are far more likely to be selected as jury forepersons than are women, even after
controlling for gender proportions in jury pools. This is not, she explains, a direct result
of being male, buWUDWKHUGXHWRFHUWDLQ³PDOH´EHKDYLRUVWKDWFRQYH\DVHQVHRI
leadership, such as speaking first.66 Of course, not all forms of deliberation involve such
a clearly defined leader; deliberation may often be more informal, without a designated
primary speaker or organizer. This lack of official authority does not mean that a trend of
male-dominated leadership will not affect these types of deliberation, however;
leadership does not need to have a formal title to be effective. Even in deliberation that is
less structured or where all have an equal chance to influence the proceedings, those who
assume informal leadership positions and are regarded by other participants as such are
likely to have greater influence in the process. If such individuals are significantly more
OLNHO\WREHPHQWKDQZRPHQLWLVOLNHO\WKDWFHUWDLQZRPHQ¶VLVVXHVDQGYLHZSRLQWVZLOO
be swept aside due to unequal representation.
While the objections I have raised so far are primarily concerned with how
women who wish to speak during deliberation are silenced, feminist theorists have also
discussed the ways in which women are discouraged from speaking in the first place.
The instatement of formal deliberative rules that provide each participant with equal
opportunities to speak is an important first step, but this provision does little to encourage
actual participation. There are a number of forces at play that can potentially result in
women feeling that their participation is unwelcome or out-of-place. For example, Jane
Mansbridge notes that shyness is a quality observed more often in women than in men.
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$OWKRXJKPHQFHUWDLQO\H[KLELWVK\EHKDYLRUDWWLPHV³WKHHTXLYDOHQWSHUFHQWDJHRIVK\
women is increased by learning silence as appropriate to WKHLUJHQGHU´67 Being raised in
a society that, in general, teaches women that male speech should take precedence over
female speech can have no other effect but to discourage deliberative participation. Of
course, I would not suggest that all women are passive listeners, speaking only when
spoken to. Rather, the traditions and cultural institutions from which women learn their
expected behavior contribute to a set of factors that undermine the equal participation and
influence idealized by deliberative theory.
As a social group, women also have a unique relationship with the deliberative
goal of accessing and promoting the common good. The wants and goals of women often
come second to those of their male counterparts, which brings into question the
universality of the common good. Mansbridge recounts her own experience with this
tradition:
Many women like myself ± white middle class citizens of the United States,
born in the 1930s and 1940s ± were taught not to have too strongly defined wants.
BoyVZRQGHUHGDVHDUO\DV³soldier, sailor, Indian chLHI´ which kinds of work
they were suited for. Girls like myself wondered, instead, what kind of man they
ZRXOGPDUU\«7UDLQLQJWREHFKRVHQUDWKHUWKDQWRFKRRVHLQFOXGHVQRW
DOORZLQJRQH¶VZDQWVWREHFRPHWRRGHILQLWH.HHSLQJRQH¶VZDQWVLQGHILQLWH
PDNHVLWHYHQKDUGHUWKDQXVXDOIRURQH¶VLQWHOOHFWWROHDUQWKHVLJQVWKHVHOIHPLWV
of wanting one thing rather than another.68
The implications this societal norm has for deliberation are substantial. If deliberation is
supposed to seek the common good, then it is important that all segments of society have
their interests represented in the process. Otherwise, a deliberative body lacks the
capability to adequately synthesize the needs of all citizens into policy oriented toward
the common good. The preferences of one group must at times inevitably be
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subordinated to the needs or wants of another group in order to reach policy decisions;
however, it is highly problematic if this subordination occurs prior to deliberation
through cultural conditioning, or if one particular group is consistently advantaged or
disadvantaged in this manner. If women are taught that their preferences come second to
those of men and are discouraged from forming strong wants and becoming conscious of
their own needs, in order to be truly included in the common good they must have a
better chance to develop an understanding of these preferences. Deliberation that values
argumentation and competition, as opposed to exploration and helping participants to
development their own ideas, is unlikely to serve this purpose. Again, this is not to say
that all women passively submit to the public preferences of their male counterparts, or
that there is no such thing as an ambitious and assertive woman. Rather, I simply wish to
point out that a culture that encourages passivity among women is a challenge for
deliberation that must be met with careful attention.
Finally, linguists and communications scholars have devoted a considerable
amount of attention to the way in which language itself is gendered and therefore
disadvantages women in discourse and deliberation.69 Nora Räthzel explains that one
JRDORIGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLVLV³WRLOOXPLQDWHWKHVSHFLILFPHFKDQLVPVWKURXJKZKLFK
dominance/subordination ± elements which structure society as a whole ± are produced in
GDLO\OLIH´70 If language is not neutral, but rather part of the construction of gendered
societal norms and expectations, then deliberation that relies on argumentation alone is
unlikely to be an effective means for subordinated gender groups to address their needs.
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According to one theory, men control language, thereby creating meaning in a process
from which women have been systematically excluded. The words we use have been
encoded with a male perspective, which is often at odds with the silenced feminine
standpoint.71 Examples of this include words such as mankind and manmade. Such
gendered language construction clearly disadvantages women in deliberation, as the
words the participants use to discuss social and political issues carry with them a
masculine view of the world.
However, this theory of language is by no means the only interpretation; while
some see dominance through language, others merely see difference.72 Deborah Tannen,
for example, asserts that men and women often have very different goals they wish to
accomplish through the use of language. While males learn to use language to assert
power and negotiate hierarchy, females instead learn to use language to create bonds and
establish solidarity.73 Such a difference certainly seems less oppressive than the
dominance theory described above. However, any validity we may assign to 7DQQHQ¶V
ideas is also troublesome. In deliberation that favors straightforward argumentation and
cool reason, it is often the strongest and most persuasive argument that wins. Therefore,
if masculine language is more oriented toward asserting power while feminine dialogue
aims at building solidarity, it seems likely that the arguments advanced by men have a
competitive advantage. Moreover, those individuals who are particularly concerned
about fostering social ties may refrain from arguing their points of view as strongly,
preferring consensus over conflict. We see, then, that whether language is structured in
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dominance, or rather serves different purposes for men and women, that gender matters a
great deal in deliberation. There is certainly a great deal more to be said about gender
and deliberation from a linguistic perspective. This introduction to the topic should,
however, at least show that the way we use words has a considerable effect on our
political deliberation.
Stereotype and Expectations
In addition to norms of deliberation that favor certain groups, the perceptions that
these individuals have of one another also have considerable potential to undermine
empathy in GHPRFUDWLFGHOLEHUDWLRQ3UHYLRXVO\,PHQWLRQHG6DQGHUV¶ZDUQLQJDJDLQVW
conceptualizing citizens as raceless, classless, and genderless. Often following from
5DZOV¶RULJLQDOSRVLWLRQGHOLEHUDWLYHWKHRULVWVWHQGWRGLVFXVVDUJXPHQWVVHSDUDWHO\IURP
the individuals who give them. While it is certainly true that the personal characteristics
of speakers can neither enhance nor diminish the rationality of their arguments, this fact
says nothing about how individuals are perceived by their fellow citizens, which in turn
dictates how their arguments are interpreted. There does not exist a single person who
does not possess some degree of preconceptions, stereotypes, or expectations of others
based upon their physical and socially-defined features. Unlike the perfectly rational
entities of the original position, human beings who are situated within a particular place
in society cannot totally separate the content of an argument from the identity of the
person who gives it. Of course, working to become aware of and dispel such notions
goes a long way toward a more inclusive and just public discourse. However, due to the
difficulty of ridding ourselves completely of these beliefs (however irrational they may
be), how deliberative participants receive various arguments will be colored by the
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preconceptions they have of the individuals who offer them, in a way that does not
GHSHQGRQWKHDFWXDOFRQWHQWRIWKHVSHHFK6XFKDUHDFWLRQEDVHGRQRQH¶VVRFLDOJURXS
for example, is yet another way in which voices of oppressed groups can be silenced in
public discourse.
The public debate over welfare is a helpful illustration of the ways in which
stereotypes about race, gender, and class prevent true deliberative equality. Ange-Marie
Hancock demonstrates this point effectively with her discussion of a hearing in the
United States House of Representatives regarding the proposed 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. During this hearing, a particular
Congressman reads about the experiences of Bertha Bridges, a single mother welfare
recipient. Hancock writes:
When citizens like Bertha Bridges are thrust into the public sphere for political
SXUSRVHVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU³UHDVRQDEOH´GHPRFUDWLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQRISROLF\
options is bleak. Reading the first excerpt from the Congressional Record
triggers a comparison of Bridges to stereotypes about welfare recipients. This act
of cognition occurs so quickly that before we read her own words (as quoted by a
journalist), we have given her an identity that acts from that point forward as an
interpretive filter. Whether her words reinforce or contest the identity assigned by
the reader, any political claim she may make later in the article is still considered
in the context of that identity.74
The fact that Bridges did not actually testify about her experiences before Congress
should not deter us from considering the problem that Hancock describes here; had
Bridges said her words aloud in the chamber, the effect would be the same. There is an
identity associated with the stereotypical welfare recipient, a lens through which
arguments about social programs are considered. This process occurs both
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unintentionally and often unconsciously; as Hancock notes, the stereotypes that come to
mind affect our judgments from the beginning of the process.
Undoubtedly, stereotypes exist for all groups, not just marginalized or
subordinated ones. The preconceived notions that people hold about the Congressman
who used Bridges as an example are likely to be just as strong as their beliefs about the
mother herself. The difference, however, is that dominant social groups generally have
better opportunities to define their public identity than do oppressed populations. The
LGHQWLW\RIWKHVWHUHRW\SLFDOVLQJOHPRWKHUZKRFROOHFWVZHOIDUHLVLQODUJHSDUW³VKDSHG
by political elites, academicians, and the meGLD´75 When such an individual arrives at a
deliberative setting, as soon as she begins to speak her words are heard through a filter
that others have constructed ± DQLGHQWLW\WKDWKDVEHHQEXLOWE\WKRVHZKRKDYH³KLJKHU´
social standing. Her dominant counterparts, of course, have their own socially-defined
identities as well. However, because dominant groups possess greater resources and are
generally overrepresented in political office, academia, and high-profile media positions,
they are better able to define their own identities. In other words, the perspectives of the
dominant groups are, at least in part, transmitted through the social identities they
participate in creating. By contrast, oppressed or subordinated groups have their social
identities shaped to a much greater extent by the discourse other groups have about them.
As a consequence, the social identities of these groups do not convey their own
perspectives, but are rather additional instruments to reinforcing the understandings of the
dominant groups. Without the ability to communicate their experiences free from the
influence of stereotypes, subordinated groups will have difficulty finding empathy in
deliberation.
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Although human psychology simply does not allow us to rid ourselves of all
stereotypes, this is not to say that our political processes must proceed according to these
SUHFRQFHSWLRQV$V+DQFRFNZULWHVDWUXO\LQFOXVLYHSXEOLFGLVFRXUVH³UHTXLUHVWKH
abandonment of preconceived notions of other citizens and the accurate interpretation of
LQGLYLGXDOV¶YDU\LQJH[SHULHQFHV´76 This is not to say that just political processes must
take place only at the individual level; rather, in order to effectively include voices from
outside the dominant perspective, we must be able to accept communication from an
individual as herself, not as part of a group about which we have predetermined ideas. I
will offer a way to accomplish this goal in my concluding chapter.
Double Consciousness
Of course, perceptions of deliberative participants do not only affect women; I
WXUQQRZWRWKHSKHQRPHQRQNQRZQDV³GRXEOHFRQVFLRXVQHVV´DQGWKHHIIHFWVWKDWLWPD\
have on racial minorities in the deliberative process. In Chapter I, I described the
phenomenon Du Bois identifies as second sight, which I argued is a valuable resource for
bridging gaps in understanding. However, this ability can have harmful consequences for
those who possess it under certain circumstances. I repeat here the quote from Chapter I,
along with the text that follows:
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teutonic and
Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world, ± a world which yields him no true selfconsciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always
ORRNLQJDWRQH¶VVHOIWKURXJKWKHH\HVRIRWKHUVRIPHDVXULQJRQH¶VVRXOE\WKH
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his
two-ness, ± an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
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strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength keeps it
from being torn asunder.77
This passage provides a good deal of insight into the psychological effects that racism
and racial hierarchy ± formal or informal ± can have on members of a racial minority
group in a society such as the United States. Interpreting this passage, Gooding-Williams
argues that:
[E]xercising the power of second sight need not lead to a false self-consciousness
± that is, to an untrue, self-misrepresenting, self-consciousness ± although it will
lead to false self-consciousness in contemporary America (³LQWKLV$PHULFDQ
world´ «SUHcisely because the perspective of the white world in contemporary
America happens to be defined by the racially prejudiced disclosure of Negro
life.78
Although second sight is not inherently harmful, second sight involving a perspective
based on prejudice is likely to give members of the outside group a distorted, negative
self-image. In this way, the beliefs that a dominant group has about a subordinated one
may prevent the latter group from having sufficient empathy toward its own experiences.
So how exactly do the effects of double consciousness play out in the process of
political deliberation? Recall from earlier that a set of formal rules for deliberation aimed
at equality, fairness, and non-domination does not guarantee these ideals in practice; the
influences, hierarchies and power structures of the other spheres of life cannot be
sequestered from deliberative practices as though citizens entered into deliberation with
blank slates. One particular way in which this issue may appear is with regard to
frequency of participation. A central tenet of deliberative theory is that all who wish to
participate should have an equal opportunity to do so. However, deliberative theorists
often seem to make the mistake of assuming that permission to speak is the only
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GHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRURIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQ,QUHDOLW\WKHUHLVDKRVWRIRWKHU
social and psychological factors that are involved, including, I argue, double
consciousness.
As noted by Iris Marion Young in her discussion of the shortcomings of
GHOLEHUDWLYHWKHRU\³WKHVRFLDOSRZHUWKDWFDQSUHYHQWSHRSOHIURPEHLQJequal speakers
derives not only from economic dependence or political domination but also from an
internalized sense of the right one has to speak or not to speak, and from the devaluation
RIVRPHSHRSOH¶VVW\OHRIVSHHFKDQGWKHHOHYDWLRQRIRWKHUV´79 The racialized feedback
that an individual receives through the loop of double consciousness is likely to lead that
individual to believe that, despite formal deliberative rules allowing (or even
encouraging) equal participation, her or his input is not welcome, not worth providing, or
out-of-line. Along with this effect comes the possibility that valid viewpoints and
perspectives that would not be raised by the dominant racial group in a deliberative
setting will never surface and receive their due attention. Even if racial minorities do
participate, the attention their ideas receive is often dependent upon how often they
speak;80 therefore, if double consciousness causes these individuals even to believe that
they ought to listen more than speak, the deliberative process fails to meet its goal of the
consideration of all viewpoints. As far as this racialized sense of right to participation
exists, it negatively affects not just the racial minorities who experience it but also the
political society as a whole. As Lawrie Balfour observes, Du Bois believed that, through
the process of double consciousness, subjugated racial minorities are uniquely fit to
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DGGUHVVWKLVW\SHRILVVXHDVWKH\DUHEHVWDEOHWR³REVHUYHWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKH
$PHULFDQLGHDOV«DQG$PHULFDQSUDFWLFHVRIV\VWHPDWLFUDFLDOGHJUDGDWLRQ´81
Suppose, however, that the effects of double consciousness do not prevent racial
minorities from participating as often as their white counterparts. This supposition still
would not mean that double consciousness has no effect upon this deliberative creation of
public consciousness. Recall that double conscLRXVQHVVKDVWKHHIIHFWRIVNHZLQJRQH¶V
perception of oneself, being filtered through the eyes of the dominant racial group. If we
FRQWLQXH:DOVK¶s analogy from Chapter I, such false self-consciousness is likely to skew
not only the perspectives that racial minorities have regarding their own identities, but
also on the part of the sphere visible to these individuals. Therefore, as the public
consciousness as a whole is shaped in part by these skewed, doubly-conscious
perspectives, the public as a whole is subject to the effects of double consciousness via
WKHLQFRPSOHWHYLHZWKDWLWKDVRI:DOVK¶VVSKHUH
Double consciousness can also interact with perceptions of communication styles
in political settings. Theorists who have examined the shortcomings of political
deliberation have argued that the centrality of reason and logical progression of
argumentation to the process is anything but culturally neutral, and that the contributions
of certain groups are denigrated due to their more emotional expressions.82 However, as I
have argued above, it is unlikely that certain social groups are in fact greatly more
emotional than others; rather, these groups are simply perceived to be more emotional,
and therefore irrational in their communication. Formal argumentation is seen as the only
acceptable means of communication within a deliberative setting. As other modes of
                                                                                                                      
81

/DZULH%DOIRXU³µ$0RVW'LVDJUHHDEOH0LUURU¶5DFH&RQVFLRXVQHVVDV'RXEOH&RQVFLRXVQHVV´
Political Theory 26 (1998): 349.
82
6HHIRUH[DPSOH<RXQJ³&RPPXQLFDWLRQDQGWKH2WKHU´-125.

47
communication are deemed illegitimate, the groups who are perceived as too emotional
and not rational ± often racial minorities and women ± receive the message that their
contributions and experiences do not meet the requirements for inclusion in deliberation.
As a result, this message contributes through double consciousness to a false selfconsciousness that discourages full deliberative participation.
In summary, the concept of race itself taints the process of political deliberation
through the false self-consciousness possessed by racial minorities that double
consciousness brings about. By instilling a notion that one has less right to participate, a
EHOLHIWKDWRQH¶VLQSXWLVQRWDVGHVLUHGRUOHJLWLPDWHDVWKDWRIWKHGRPLQDQWUDFLDOJURXS
RUE\FUHDWLQJDVNHZHGSHUVSHFWLYHRIRQHVHOIWKDWLVXWLOL]HGLQWKHFUHDWLRQRI³WKH
SXEOLF´GRXEle consciousness inhibits the incorporation of racial minorities into a model
of deliberation that lives up to the ideal proposed by deliberative theorists. Perhaps most
LPSRUWDQWO\ZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKLVSURMHFWZHRXJKWWRUHPHPEHU'X%RLV¶FODLPWhat
the second sight associated with double consciousness is available only to those who
have experienced the necessary hardships. Such a perspective cannot necessarily be
easily explained or rationally conveyed. This communicative gap across experiences
exposes an important shortcoming of the deliberative process, one that impedes the
development of intergroup empathy. In the next section, I will explore more concretely
the challenge this type of divergence poses for deliberative theory.
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CHAPTER IV
DISTORTED COMMUNICATION AND GAPS IN UNDERSTANDING
So far I have addressed the internal exclusion that results from stereotypes and
expectations that those who participate in deliberation have about each other as well as
themselves. Those obstacles to the emergence of empathy are both substantial and
pervasive, and must be attended to accordingly. There are other challenges to
deliberative democracy, however, that arguably run deeper and are more difficult to
identify. Instead of interpersonal perceptions, these obstacles function through the
divergent understandings that dominant and subordinated groups have about the
sociopolitical order. This gap in understanding is where the distorted communication that
I discussed in the first chapter presents a challenge that cannot be addressed through
traditional deliberation that relies only on argumentation and reason-giving. Through the
FRQFHSWVRISXEOLFPHPRU\&DUROH3DWHPDQ¶VWKHRU\RIWKHVH[XDOFRQWUDFW83 and
whiteness, I explore in the following sections a small collection of examples of how
deliberation can fail in the absence of empathy. I also demonstrate that we must address
fundamental differences in our understandings of political issues outside of such a strict
conception of deliberation.
Public Memory and Political Deliberation
One topic that has shown up in a great deal of critical race theory literature, at
least with regard to the United States, is public memory or public consciousness.
Although conceptions and terminology differ slightly from author to author, the basic
premise is this: there is a gap between the conception of the political order understood by
the dominant racial group and that of subordinated racial groups as a result of, among
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other things, misinformation and dissonant memories of past events and the continuing
legacies of these events. These public memories may result from unintentional ignorance
and/or intentional forgetting and suppression. Within the context of the United States,
this often plays out in reference to slavery or Jim Crow laws. For example, Thomas
McCarthy notes that, in contradiction to the actual history of their country, most
Americans believe that slavery was a distinctly Southern phenomenon, having little or no
part in the history of the rest of the country or the United States as a whole.84
Additionally, he writes that whites in the United States fail to recognize that racial bias
DQGUDFLVWSUDFWLFHVKDYHEHHQDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\QRWDGHYLDWLRQ
from the norm.85 Such a crucial misunderstanding helps to obscure the continuing legacy
of racist practices, which is wholly visible to subordinated racial groups, from the view of
the dominant group. With regard to a slightly different but certainly related phenomenon,
Juliet Hooker argues that a public memory that only recognizes certain aspects of the past
has the peculiar effect not of obscuring past collective wrongs per se but of
memorializing them in such a way that individuals and political communities are
absolved of responsibility for such wrongs. As a result, members of dominant
groups do not develop conceptions of political obligation toward those among
their fellow citizens who have suffered as a consequence.86
It might not be clear at first why the issue of public memory should be an obstacle
to proper political deliberation. In fact, one might assert that deliberation is exactly the
setting in which the public memories of the dominant and subordinated racial groups
might converge, through formal measures guaranteeing equality, non-domination, and so
forth. In other words, we might see deliberation as the means to reconcile divergent
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understandings of how our beliefs about race structure our political systems. However,
dissonant conceptions of the public order in fact preclude the type of communication and
shared meaning that are necessary for deliberation that achieves such a goal.
A case study of a particular instance of political deliberation will be helpful in
demonstrating this problem. In 2000, Mendelberg and Oleske published a study of a pair
RIWRZQKDOOPHHWLQJVLQ1HZ-HUVH\ZKLFKDWWKHWLPHRIWKHDUWLFOH¶VSXEOLFDWLRQ
had the fourth largest degree of segregation in public schools in the United States. These
meetings were held to address a YDULHW\RISURVSHFWLYHSODQVRI³UHJLRQDOL]DWLRQ´RUWKH
creation of a racially integrated regional school district.87 In these particular meetings,
the localities in question were Englewood, whose Dwight Morrow High School was
predominantly black and Hispanic, and the surrounding towns of Leonia, Tenafly, and
Englewood Heights, which all were home to white majorities. In 1965 Englewood Cliffs,
which had been too small to support its own high school at the time, signed a contract to
send its students to Dwight Morrow in Englewood. However, starting in 1977,
Englewood Cliffs and the other majority-white towns in the area put forth efforts to
bypass such contracts and sever relationships with Englewood, despite the state board of
HGXFDWLRQ¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDWstudents could obtain a good education at Dwight Morrow. It
was in response to these efforts that the state proposed its plans of regionalization.88
The first of the two meetings was held in Leonia and was attended almost
exclusively by whites from Leonia and other predominantly white towns. Those who
spoke at that meeting were exclusively white. Only one speaker was in favor of
regionalization, and the audience included fewer than ten blacks. The second meeting,
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held in Englewood proper, was significantly more racially diverse. There were whites
who spoke both in favor of and against regionalization, as well as blacks and Hispanics
who all spoke in favor of the plans. Particularly striking about this meeting is the fact
that all of the whites who spoke against regionalization were from Leonia or Tenafly.
:KLOHWKH/HRQLD RU³VHJUHJDWHG´ PHHWLQJZDVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\FRQVHQVXVDURXQGWKH
LVVXHWKH(QJOHZRRG RU³LQWHJUDWHG´ PHHWLQJVHHPHGWRH[DFHUEDWHSUH-existing
tensions between the citizens of Englewood and the surrounding towns.89 While there are
numerous points in this study from which we can examine the difficulties of political
deliberation, what I would like to focus on here is the lack of obligation felt by the
citizens of Leonia toward their counterparts living in Englewood.
The citizens at the Leonia meeting expressed the fact that they felt no solidarity
with, and therefore obligation toward, the residents of Englewood. A prevalent opinion
expressed at the meeting in Leonia was that they were afraid of having the preferences of
³RXWVLGHUV´IRUFHGXSRQWKHLUFRPPXQLW\:KLOHthe identity of these outsiders was
rarely clarified, it was clear that nobody was referring to white students from outside of
Leonia, as many such students were actively recruited by the Leonia school system.90
Language such as this clearly demonstrates that there was no political solidarity present
between the cities of Leonia and Englewood.91 Additionally, noting the relationships
between Leonia and the other overwhelmingly white towns in the area shows us that what
solidarity did exist was largely structured along racial lines.
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Indeed, this racialized solidarity should not be surprising; Juliet Hooker argues
that racialized solidarity in fact is and has been the norm in the United States. Most
importantly, such racialized solidarity affects the obligations that members of the
dominant racial group feel toward minorities.92 Many of the speakers made statements
along the lines of ³,ZLOOQRWDOORZWKHTXDOLW\RIP\FKLOG¶VHGXFDWLRQWREHVDFULILFHGWR
VROYHVRPHRQHHOVH¶VSUREOHP´93 Such repeated references to the level of education in
the city of Englewood as a problem that does not concern, or even affect, the citizens of
nearby towns demonstrates that the feelings of obligation between the citizens of towns
such as Leonia, Tenafly, and Englewood Heights do not extend to those living in
Englewood. Remembering that the populations of the public schools between
Englewood and the surrounding towns are heavily stratified by race, we can see that the
political and social obligations felt by these citizens are divided along racial lines as well.
Another type of statement made by white speakers at the meeting in Englewood
illuminates the role that public memory plays in this racialized solidarity. Similarly to
WKHVWDWHPHQWVUHIHUULQJWR³RXWVLGHUV´PHQWLRQHGDERYHPDQ\RIWKHZKLWHVSHDNHUV
DVVHUWHGWKDW³(QJOHZRRGDORQHZDVWREODPHIRULWVSUREOHPVVR(QJOHZRRGVKRXOG
solve its prREOHPVRQLWVRZQ´94 Such an assertion implicitly claims that the educational
circumstances and opportunities available to the black students in Englewood are solely
the result of the practices and decisions of the black community; this demonstrates a lack
of understanding of the enduring legacy of not only slavery, but also the discriminatory
housing practices and other initiatives of state and local governments that resulted in the
FRQFHQWUDWLRQRILPSRYHULVKHGEODFN$PHULFDQVLQWKHQDWLRQ¶VFLWLHV To assert that the
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(black) citizens of Englewood are solely to blame for the poor performance of Dwight
Morrow high school amounts to simple victim-blaming that fails to recognize the true
causes of poverty and poor education.95
We can clearly see, then, that a (white) public memory in these New Jersey
localities that fails to acknowledge the continuing effects of past racist practices results in
a lack of political solidarity between the smaller (white) towns and the larger (black)
Englewood, in turn precluding feelings of mutual obligation between the groups in
question. This phenomenon is problematic for the deliberative process in at least two
ways: First, as explained by Walter Baber, in order for deliberation to be effective, both
intragroup and intergroup solidarity must exist. This necessity stems from the trust that
members of another group will act justly that comes along with political solidarity.96
When the intergroup solidarity is absent, however, we see that the ensuing absence of
trust prevents a consensus between two groups such as the residents of Englewood and
WKHLUZKLWHQHLJKERUV)RUH[DPSOHWKHEODFNFLWL]HQVRI(QJOHZRRG³UHSHDWHGO\
LQGLFDWHGWKHLUVNHSWLFLVPWRZDUGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIFRPSURPLVH´EDVHGXSRQ³ZKDWWKH\
perceived to be tKHRWKHUVLGH¶VJURXS-interested, exclusive, DQGUDFLVWDUJXPHQWV´97
While many of the arguments advanced by non-Englewood residents against the
proposed schemes of integration undoubtedly exhibited these characteristics, the lack of
trust involved with the deliberative process undermined any chance to address the issues
at hand.
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Secondly, divergent public memories operating within the black and white
communities of the Englewood area contributed to the preclusion of a shared notion of
the common good. Clearly, toward which groups one feels a sense of duty and obligation
will VKDSHRQH¶VYLHZRIZKDWDQGZKRVKRXOGFRXQWDVSDUWRIWKHFRPPRQJRRG
Therefore, a racialized political solidarity will work to exempt racial minorities from
inclusion in the common good. In the segregated meeting held in Leonia, white cities
advanced lines of reasoning that were often viewed as arguments for the common good,
and these arguments were well-received by the members of the white community. For
example, few speakers referenced their own children, instead maintaining focus on the
overall well-being of the community.98 However, these same arguments were received
quite differently at the integrated meeting in Englewood; what were previously seen as
arguments for the common good were interpreted as racist, divisive, and oriented toward
the well-being of a specific (white) group.99 %HFDXVH³ZKDWFLWL]HQVFKRRVHWRUHPHPEHU
about the past and the mode of that remembrance determines the kinds of relations of
SROLWLFDOREOLJDWLRQWKH\HVWDEOLVKZLWKRQHDQRWKHULQWKHSUHVHQW´100 the public memory
that shapes the political conceptions of the white citizens of the areas surrounding
Englewood limits their ideas about who ought to count in the calculation of the common
good. We can see how this plays out by observing that the segregated white meeting in
Leonia was characterized by a consensus regarding the common good, while the
integrated Englewood meeting was characterized by hostile disagreement regarding that
same concept.

                                                                                                                      
98

0HQGHOEHUJDQG2OHVNH³5DFHDQG3XEOLF'HOLEHUDWLRQ´-182.
Ibid., 182-185.
100
Hooker, Race and the Politics of Solidarity, 106.
99

55
I have shown that a public memory that fails to account for the reality of the
continuing harm of racist practices has fatal implications for political deliberation
involving diverse racial groups, especially when one of these groups has historically
dominated another. Clearly, in order for multiracial deliberative democracy to be
effective in a society whose history has involved such domination there must be a
reconceptualization of the political order and recognition of past injustices. However, it
appears that traditional deliberation fails to bridge the gap between the divergent
conceptualizations of this political order. Later on I will explore other methods for
potentially closing this divide; for now, I simply wish to demonstrate the challenge posed
to deliberative theory by the concept of racialized public memory. Because those situated
outside the oppressed racial group lack the understanding of a racialized political order, a
traditional model of deliberative democracy lacks the necessary tools to effectively create
empathy to address issues involving race. I will return again to the work of Mendelberg
and Oleske in a later section addressing the phenomenon of whiteness.
The Sexual Contract and Deliberation
Similarly to most of the other challenges I examine in this project, divergent
understandings of the public order can affect many different subordinated groups.
Divisions in understanding of the sociopolitical order are not only structured along racial
lines, but along gender lines as well. +HUHWKURXJKWKHZRUNRI&DUROH3DWHPDQ¶VWKHRU\
of the sexual contract,101 I will explore one way in which this challenge may present
itself.
Drawing on and critiquing traditional social contract theory, Pateman explores the
consequences of the exclusion of women from the original social contract paired with
                                                                                                                      
101

Pateman, The Sexual Contract.

56
their inclusion in the resulting social order. She explains that social contract theory is, in
part, based on a simultaneous denial and assumption about DZRPDQ¶VDELOLW\WRHQWHULQWR
a contract. While women are ± in the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, for
example ± deemed unfit for inclusion in agreements regarding the political order, they are
characterized as capable of entering into a contract of marriage.102 Though denied full
political rights in the formation of the state, women are seen as fully able to enter into
agreement with a husband that surrenders their autonomy in exchange for economic
benefits.
This sexual contract is likely to undermine the process of deliberation. Because
the claims made in deliberation are often oriented toward notions of justice and fairness,
various understandings of societal agreements are vital to the process. Claims about the
traditional social contract between the people and their government, for example, are
unlikely to be controversial. The validity of claims regarding the sexual contract as
theorized by Pateman, however, could easily be evaluated differently by those who have
experienced the effects of this contract in different ways. The male citizens who have
benefited from the sexual contract are unlikely to see how this contract has and continues
to structure our society, wages, and gender relations.
The discussion over welfare reform will help to illustrate this issue.103 Let us set
aside for now the problem that those who are in most need of welfare ± e.g., single
mothers ± are the least likely to have the resources to devote to deliberative participation.
Instead, I wish to focus on societal understandings of gender roles. A vital aspect of the
marriage contract is the division of labor between men and women. While husbands
                                                                                                                      
102
103

Ibid., 54.
The debate around welfare, of course, can also shed light on the racial barriers to effective deliberation.

57
have traditionally worked outside the home to earn the wages necessary to support a
family, other tasks such as child care have fallen to their wives. This division of labor is,
in fact, a presupposition of the entire capitalist wage system.104 An important implication
of this contract is that the individuals needing government assistance are
disproportionately women. Unfortunately, the welfare system does not adequately reflect
WKLVUHDOLW\$V1DQF\)UDVHUH[SODLQV³>H@[LVWLQJZHOIDUHVWDWHVDUHSUHPLVHGRQ
assumptions about gender that are increasingly out of SKDVHZLWKPDQ\SHRSOH¶VOLYHVDQG
self-XQGHUVWDQGLQJV´105 While the gender order of early capitalism was centered on the
male head of the household earning a family wage that was sufficient to support his
family, the economic roles played by women have changed dramatically. With the
entrance of women into the workplace and an increasing rate of single-mother
households, this antiquated description no longer characterizes the conditions of our
society. However, the welfare state is in still in many ways ³EXLOWRQDVVXPSWLRQVRI
male-KHDGHGIDPLOLHV´DQGLV³QRORQJHUVXLWHGWRSURYLGLQJ>HFRQRPLF@SURWHFWLRQ´106
This reality raises the question of how to appropriately restructure welfare
systems ± not simply specific proposals, but also the principles upon which a new system
ought to be based. Rejecting both conservative and neoliberal welfare reform proposals,
Frasier asserts that an appropriate welfare structure for a postindustrial world must be
premised on gender equity. Among her conditions for true gender equity is what she
refers to as equality of respect. While tasks historically performed by women have not
EHHQXQGHUVWRRGDVFRPSDUDEOHWRWKH³EUHDG-ZLQQLQJ´ZRUNSHUIRUPHGE\WKHLUPDOH
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counterparts, Fraser calls for the recognition of the work such as child care that falls
predominantly to women to perform. At the same time, Fraser emphasizes the
importance of avoiding any androcentric welfare reforms. Gender equity, she argues,
requires not only the recognition RIZRPHQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGWKH full recognition of
their personhood, but also the assurance that their equal standing is not premised on the
adoption of masculinist norms and institutions. Such a condition will not necessarily
result from bringing more women into the workforce or allocating funds to single
working mothers. This type of reform instead requires the revaluation of traits and
practices, as well as a change in the way both men and women understand gender, work,
and citizenship.107
This is where the true difficulty for deliberative democracy enters the picture. If
a just reformulation of the welfare state depends upon a fundamentally different
understanding of what it means to work ± to be an active and full participant in the
maintenance and development of our society ± then traditional deliberation is an
inadequate tool for the project. Argumentation is sure to be an acceptable means of
communicating the statistics regarding welfare and their implications, the history of
welfare laws, and even the need for some sort of systemic reformulation. Deliberative
participants are likely to find it difficult, however, to fundamental alter other participants
understanding of what it means to work. As I have shown in the previous section, this
type of communication has difficulty fostering empathy and is therefore not well-suited
to challenging and reshaping understandings of the political and social order. The
possibility of implementing welfare reform that ensures gender equity depends in part on
challenging a particular conception of what it means to work. This conception derives
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from a distinctly masculine perspective and dominates our political discourse. Therefore,
such a project must be based upon an alternate perspective that can convey the reality of
the many ways in which one can work and provide necessary contributions to the family
and society without earning wages. The town meetings recounted by Mendelberg and
Oleske, however, demonstrate the difficulty of challenging a dominant understanding
through deliberation alone. The experiences of those who have found the sexual contract
to work against them ± primarily but not exclusively women ± must be taken into
consideration, but the perspective that arises from such experiences is not easily
conveyed.
This issue also serves as a powerful illustration of the dangers of internal
exclusion. Along with discouraging certain styles of communication and assuming
informal leadership positions, members of dominant social groups may also unwittingly
exclude the perspectives or proposals of other groups. In other words, quantitatively
equal participation is not necessarily sufficient for true equality in deliberation. This
measurement is often employed to test for deliberative equality; empirical researchers
tend to use methods such as examining the number or proportion of total speech acts or
per social group.108 While it has certain merits, this type of measurement fails to take
into consideration the responsiveness of a deliberative body as a whole to speech acts that
challenge dominant understandings. Granted, this is a considerably more difficult
empirical task. The fact remains, though, that no amount of participation by a
subordinated group within the paradigm set by the understanding of a dominant group
will effectively convey certain needs. More concretely, deliberation regarding welfare
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reforms that fails to challenge a masculinist understanding of work will not effectively
address the needs of single mothers, no matter how many of them have a chance to speak.
Whiteness
In a previous section, I discussed the problems posed by the double consciousness
of racial minorities. In order to fully understand the difficulty of bridging experiential
gaps in political understanding, I believe it will be useful to discuss the consciousness of
the dominant (white) group separately here.109 One of the greatest obstacles to political
deliberation that approaches the ideals of deliberative theory is the fact that the dominant
racial group often does not recognize the racialized nature of the political order, which I
discussed earlier. American whites often fail to realize that the society in which they live
continues to be characterized by racially-determined lines of inclusion and exclusion.110
The failure to recognize this fact precludes the empathy and shared meaning that is
necessary for political deliberation to achieve its goals.
We can see how this problem manifests by revisiting the town hall meetings held
in Leonia and Englewood. At the segregated meeting held in Leonia, the speakers based
their arguments against the proposed plans of integration on ostensibly non-racial
premises about issues such as outsiders, quality of education, and neighborhood schools.
Within the context of a meeting that included only white speakers from outside of
Englewood, these arguments were accepted by all as neutral and oriented toward the
common good, both necessary requirements for good deliberation. However, the same
routes of argumentation were rejected as thinly-veiled racism at the integrated meeting
that took place in Englewood. In a perfect summary of this sentiment, the final speaker at
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that meeting stated that the white opponents of state-OHGLQWHJUDWLRQZHUHQRWKLQJEXW³D
ORXGPREOHGE\IHDUDQGLJQRUDQFHUDWKHUWKDQUHDVRQDQGFRPPRQVHQVH´111
Mendelberg and Oleske argue that the interpretation of the arguments by the black
citizens of Englewood was accurate, and I certainly do not intend to disagree with them.
What is important to emphasize is that, to the white citizens of the surrounding towns,
their arguments were fair and sound ± not based upon race at all, but instead upon
promoting the public good of their society. We can clearly see here the effects of
systematically distorted communication. As they have not experienced the ways in
which these type of arguments negatively affect groups other than their own, the white
citizens do not understand that their claims to fairness and justice in fact carried unfair
and unjust consequences. Because of their inability to recognize the whiteness that
characterized their arguments and the racialized structure of society at large, these
individuals failed to see how intrinsically linked to race their arguments about topics such
as freedom from outside influence actually were. In other words, the language used by
the white speakers had two completely different meanings to the different racial groups,
preventing any effective deliberation from taking place. As Mendelberg and Oleske note,
EHFDXVH³WKHSRVLWLYHHIIHFWVRIGHOLEHUDWLRQUHVWRQWKHDELOLW\RIWKHRSSRVLQJVLGHVWR
FRPPXQLFDWHDERXWWKHLUGLVDJUHHPHQW´³>Z@Ken the meaning of speech is contested,
GHOLEHUDWLRQLVXQOLNHO\WREHUHDVRQHGRUFRQVHQVXDO´112 This barrier of the meaning
behind the language used in deliberation will remain in multiracial deliberative settings, I
argue, until white citizens are able and willing to fully recognize their whiteness.
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Some argue that the contested meaning of language and disputed validity of
arguments can be addressed through the deliberative process itself. For example, Seyla
Benhabib argues that her model of deliberative democracy allows for such challenges
DJDLQVW³PLVXVHVDQGDEXVHV´RIDUJXPHQWDWLRQDQGODQJXDJH³WREHFKDOOHQJHGDWD
VHFRQGPHWDOHYHORIGLVFRXUVH´113 While this is certainly desirable as an ideal of
deliberation, scenarios such as the meeting in Englewood reveal the futility of such metadeliberation under certain circumstances. Divergent beliefs held by the black and white
citizens of the area about how their political society is structured proved to be an
insurmountable obstacle; the anger expressed DORQJZLWKWKH$IULFDQ$PHULFDQFLWL]HQV¶
expression of not accepting the legitimacy of the arguments of their white counterparts
impeded this process, and the failure of the white citizens to recognize their whiteness
prevented them from seeing how their argumentation violated the conditions for proper,
successful deliberation. This violation resulted not from any malicious intent on the part
of the participants, but rather from the way in which the divergent perspectives of the
groups involved prevented a shared meaning of the definition of the problem at hand.
This is also a helpful illustration of how negative or overtly exclusive intentions
are not necessary for deliberation to fall short of its ideals. In Chapter I, I stated that one
purpose of this project is to explore the ways in which certain perspectives are
marginalized in deliberation even in the presence of inclusive intentions. It is not
difficult to see how overt racism would undermine the deliberative process. However,
the effects of blind privilege may undermine deliberation even without such attitudes.
While the white citizens of Leonia, Tenafly, and Englewood Heights were certainly not
staunch advocates of radical racial justice, they did not appear to be white supremacists
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either. Rather, these citizens were simply concerned with the common good of what they
perceived to be their community, and the satisfaction of obligations to those whom they
believed obligations were owed.
Although both occur in the absence of malicious intentions, the effects of
privilege function in a manner distinct from stereotypes. Whereas stereotypes undermine
GHOLEHUDWLRQE\FRORULQJRQH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIDQDUJXPHQWthrough the characteristics of
the speaker, the privilege associated with whiteness undermines deliberation by creating a
barrier to seeing how the social order is actually structured along lines that conform to
those same characteristics. Instead of stereotypes distorting perceptions of RWKHUV¶
arguments, this phenomenon thwarts deliberation through gaps in understanding created
by different experiences belonging to different racial groups. In the former scenario,
those within the dominant group question the validity of an argument based on a certain
set of preconceptions about an individual, while in the latter the same argument is
contested due to a bias that is the result of a position of privilege. It is because of both of
these effects that I argue that the contestation of the validity of arguments, at least when it
comes to issues such as racialized solidarity, must take place outside of the strict bounds
of deliberation; within these confines, it is difficult to foster the deliberation necessary to
overcome these challenges. In the final chapter of this project I will suggest that a less
rigid conceptualization of deliberative democracy may help us to overcome the obstacles
presented here.
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CHAPTER V
REASON, EMOTION, AND THE THEATRE OF THE OPPRESSED
In the previous chapters, I have discussed a number of ways in which
marginalized social groups may find themselves excluded in various ways from full
membership in a deliberative body. Such exclusion, I have argued, may manifest despite
the good intentions of deliberative participants and results in part from the difficulty of
communicating experiences of oppression through deliberation. This communication
depends on empathy, which traditional deliberation has difficulty creating. However,
these problems are largely dependent on a traditional conception of deliberation that
discourages displays of emotion as a means of communication. One avenue toward
resolving this dilemma ± the one that I shall explore here ± is to put into question the
opposition between reason and emotion that characterizes traditional deliberation. If
emotion is given a proper place in deliberation, perhaps such exclusion can be tempered,
if not avoided altogether. In this final chapter, I will review a series of arguments for
blurring the line between reason and emotion, outline prior work that highlights the
potential for emotional expression to make political communication more inclusive, and
DUJXHWKDWZHRXJKWWRFRQVLGHU%RDO¶VIRUXPWKHDWHUDVDIRUPRISROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQthat
both meets the ideals of deliberative democracy and effectively uses emotion to give
voice to marginalized groups.
Deliberation and Emotion
In Chapter I, I briefly presented the traditional deliberative opposition to the use
of emotional communication such as rhetoric. This opposition has its roots in a Kantian
focus on the autonomy of the subject and sees emotion as a force directly opposed to
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reason. Contrary to reason, this opposition states, rhetoric and emotion detract from
public knowledge and instead use illusion to persuade the public to adopt opinions and
beliefs that they would not adopt when presented only with sound arguments. In this
section of my project, I will not only challenge the notion that emotion is incompatible
with deliberation, but also the sharp distinction between reason and emotion that we often
take for granted.
This aspect of my project is by no means unique; several theorists have already
confronted the notion that emotion should be left out of our political discussions. Some
argue that forms of political communication that allow for greater emotional expression
can create a more inclusive public dialogue. This is particularly true with regard to
marginalized or silenced groups, such as the examples that I discussed in the previous
two chapters³:KHUHZHODFNVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVLQFUXFLDOUHVSHFWV´ZULWHV Iris
0DULRQ<RXQJ³VRPHWLPHVIRUPVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQRWKHUWKDQDUJXPHQWFDQVSHDN
across our differences to promote understanding´114 If traditional deliberation cannot
produce the empathy that is necessary to overcome gaps in understanding between
subordinated and dominant groups, perhaps communication that incorporates emotion
can perform this task instead.
It is largely in the connection between emotion and our political environment that
this communicative value resides. Drawing on the work of Arlie Hochschild, Kathy
Ferguson explains that our emotions do not stand in opposition to our reason, because
both provide us with a certain type of information ± ³WKH\DUHERWKZD\VLQZKLFKZH
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NQRZWKHZRUOG´115 While reason provides us with facts and understandings of how the
world around us works, emotions allow us to reflect on and evaluate this information.
The prejudice against emotion, Ferguson argues, is more a reflection of masculine fears
of losing control than of a universal characteristic of reason.116 In reality, our passions
can tell us just as much as our capacity for reason. Because deliberative theory has
traditionally favored reason over emotion, however, my goal in this section is to
challenge this attitude in order to justify the use of theater as deliberation.
Most importantly, emotion is also crucial for developing empathy, a characteristic
of communication that crosses perspectives that I discussed in the first chapter. In their
critique of bounded rationality in the workplace, Dennis Mumby and Linda Putnam argue
that emotion serves not only as a means to information, but also as a way of creating a
PRUHFRKHVLYHFRPPXQLW\%HFDXVHHPRWLRQVDUH³HPEHGGHGLQLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\«>D@V
individuals share emotional experiences, their initial sense of anonymity gives way to
feelings of community through the development of mutual affection, cohesion, and
FRKHUHQFHRISXUSRVH´117 Through emotion, interlocutors can see each other not only as
reason-givers, but as fellow components of an interconnected social web. Admittedly,
we should be skeptical of the idea that the degree of closeness and cohesion we might
find in a work environment can be easily replicated in society as a whole. Nonetheless,
we should not deny the utility of emotion in creating bonds between citizens.

                                                                                                                      
115

Kathy E. Ferguson, The F eminist Case Against Bureucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1984), 199.
116
Ibid. We might apply this idea to dominant groups in general, not just to the domination of women by
men.
117
'HQQLV.0XPE\DQG/LQGD/3XWQDP³7KH3ROLWLFVRI(PRWLRQ$)HPLQLVW5HDGLQJRI%RXQGHG
Rationality, The Academy of Management Review 17 (1992): 478.

67
It is, of course, important to recognize that appeals to emotion in political
communication can be harmful as well as beneficial to the democratic process. Claims
that rely on fear, prejudice, or anger obviously violate the norms not only of deliberation
but of most other democratic theory as well. However, emotion need not serve this
purpose. A deliberative participant may just as easily use calm and collected
argumentation motivated by fear or prejudice to advance their aims. A deliberative
theorist would likely argue here that such a maneuver violates the norms of deliberation,
in that such a speaker relies not on reasons acceptable to all, but deceit instead. This
assertion is absolutely true, and supports my overall claim. Just as one may use
argumentation for either deliberative or non-deliberative purposes, so also one may
utilize emotion in this way. Appeals to emotion that are meant to mislead other
participants should not be evaluated equally to attempts to convey information that is not
easily conveyed through other means. Various forms of communication may be used
productively or counter-productively; it is the intention behind the method that makes the
true difference.
In addition to the theoretical arguments I have outlined so far, there is a
considerable amount of scientific evidence to support the inclusion of emotion in political
dialogue. A thorough review of this literature would certainly be out of place here;
however, it is important to recognize the main thrust of this research. Perhaps the most
influential writer on this topic is Antonio Damasio. In his work on the role of emotion on
human behavior and decision-making, he lays out what he refers to as the somatic marker

hypothesis. Damasio explains that LQWKH³KLJKUHDVRQ´YLHZRIGHFLVLRQ-making ± the
one favored by those such as Kant and Descartes ± we use nothing but logical inferences
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and considered alternatives to arrive at a rational decision.118 However, Damasio argues,
if this were the only pathway to a decision then one would at best take a long time to
reach a decision, and at worst would never be able to make an informed decision at all. It
LVQRWDQHDV\WDVNKHH[SODLQVWRKROGLQRQH¶VKHDGDOORIWKHORJLFDOWXUQVDQG
situational comparisons necessary to make a decision through this type of reason alone.119
Fortunately, Damasio writes that we also have access to another means of making
decisions. In order to help us keep track of all of the information we must process in a
complex decision-making process the autonomic nervous system in the human body uses
feelings to produce somatic markers, or physical changes, such as an uncomfortable
IHHOLQJLQRQH¶VVWRPDFK7KHVHPDUNHUVDLGRXUOLPLWHGFRJQLWLYHFDSDFLW\E\GUDZLQJ
clear boundaries in the brain between acceptable and unacceptable outcomes, so that the
conscious brain need not constantly hold every piece of information or possible
permutation of argumentation. Damasio summarizes this process neatly:
In short, somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by
learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative
somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination
functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead,
it becomes a beacon of incentive.120
Damasio also takes care to explain that emotional somatic markers are not usually
sufficient on their own for proper decision making. There is still a valuable role for
GHGXFWLYHUHDVRQLQJDQGORJLFWRSOD\LQWKHSURFHVV³6RPDWLFPDUNHUV´KHZULWHV³GR
not deliberate for us. They assist the deliberation by highlighting some options (either
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dangerous or favorable) and eliminating them rapidly from VXEVHTXHQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´121
In other words, the involuntary emotional processes that occur in the brain are but one
component of the total decision-making process.
I believe there are two related but GLVWLQFWSRLQWVWRSXOOIURP'DPDVLR¶VUHVHDUFK
First, Damasio makes clear that our emotionality is a valuable resource for making
informed decisions. However, this resource is not equally available to all persons for all
issues. The somatic markers that indicate a negative outcome in reasoning or deliberation
are necessarily based upon prior life experiences. As a result, the deep emotional effects
of oppression felt by certain social groups will lead to instinctive responses during
deliberation that may seem out of touch or unreasonable to those who do not have these
same markers in place. This process is likely to lead to a further denigration of the
emotionality these groups are perceived by the dominant group to embody, and to
reinforce their outsider statuses when the inclusion of emotion is disparaged.
6HFRQG'DPDVLR¶VUHVHDUFKFOHDUO\GHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWRXUHPRWLRQVDUHDQ
inescapable reality for deliberation. Aside from any claims regarding the desirability of
emotion as part of the deliberative process, we must recognize that our emotional
responses to different ideas and proposals are not an option that we may choose not to
exercise. As our neurological system is designed to use emotions to help us process
information, attempts to separate emotionality from deliberation are destined to fail.
Additionally, for those whose somatic markers help them to navigate the deliberative
process, receiving the message that this resource is not a valid tool is likely to discourage
full participation and further reinforce their status as second-class participants. In this
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way, the question becomes not so much whether we ought to include emotion in our
deliberation, but whether we wish to resist it or utilize and embrace it.
I would like to make one final note on the importance of actively including
emotion in the deliberative process before proceeding. As I have mentioned above, the
privileging of reason over emotion has been criticized as the denigration of the feminine
in comparison to the masculine. Such opposition is said to perpetuate a gendered value
system. However, although the theorists who advocate a positive role for emotion in
political communication tend to write from within a broadly feminist tradition, it is
important to note that the implications of their ideas are not limited to women or gender
politics. The acceptance of emotion in deliberative democracy is important for the
inclusion of racial minorities and other marginalized groups as well. The denigration of
emotion is not simply a rejection of femininity (although this is often a strong
component); it is a rejection of otherness and the perspectives of those who fall outside
the boundaries of the dominant social groups. To denounce emotional expression in
public deliberation is to disadvantage those groups whose cultures and habits whose
emotionality is seen as opposed to the use of reason.
Communicative Reforms
Previous writers have not only critiqued the denigration of emotion in deliberation
± some have also offered their own ideas on how to improve communication between
marginalized groups and their dominant counterparts. There are two authors that I would
like to discuss in this regard. First, motivated by her belief that American democracy is
not yet ready to adopt deliberation as a standard, Lynn Sanders writes that:
[a]n alternative to deliberation as a model for democratic politics has to begin by
trying to rule out the problems that the critique of deliberation reveals. That is,
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the alternative should avoid stated or implicit requirements that talk be only
rational and moderate, or that the only perspectives worth attending to are
perspectives that illuminate what is common.122
In other words, Sanders seeks to find through alternate modes of communication a way to
give voice to those social groups who can be silenced or whose perspectives can be
omitted through traditional deliberation.
To achieve this goal, Sanders looks to a model of communication that also has
considerable roRWVLQ$PHULFDQKLVWRU\*LYLQJWHVWLPRQ\VKHZULWHV³KDVLPSRUWDQW
precedents in American politics, particularly in African American politics and
FKXUFKHV´123 Drawing from the traditions of one of the most subjugated social groups in
American history is certainly a positive step toward creating more inclusive conditions
for political communication. More importantly, however, testimony puts the focus on
perspectives that do not generally receive adequate attention. Instead of the traditional
deliberative focus on what is common or acceptable to all, testimony gives one individual
or group an opportunity to add their perspective to the public conversation. This is
particularly important where different social groups have not only divergent opinions, but
also fundamental differences in the ways that they conceptualize the public order.124 Of
course, the use of testimony in no way rules out the need for or the benefit from more
traditional deliberation. Testimony may provide a view into the perspective of another
group that is necessary for successful deliberation that follows. Testimony should not,
however, be left out of the formal proceedings of a deliberative body; without a
designated opportunity for any group to voice its experiences, deliberation runs the risk
of excluding these people.
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Another prominent figure in this conversation, Iris Marion Young, advocates for
much of the same type of reforms that Sanders does. However, Young expands her
discussion of these reforms a bit more than Sanders, providing a detailed explanation of
the three practices she believes are vital to inclusive public discourse: greeting, rhetoric,
DQGQDUUDWLYH(DFKRIWKHVHFRQWULEXWHVWR<RXQJ¶VWKHRU\RIFRPPXQLFDWLYH± as
opposed to deliberative ± democracy. I will discuss each of these here, as it is Young
who most strongly influences my interpretation of forum theater in the following section.
First, Young views a stage in political dialogue in which the participants greet and
acknowledge one another as vital to the success of the rest of the process. It is in this
moment in everyday dialogue, she argues, that each participant affirms her relationship
with the others, while at the same time making clear her distance and her particularity.
Effective political communication should be similarly based upon the norms of everyday
communicative ethics; proper greeting acknowledges the equality of all speakers and
helps to establish the trust necessary to engage in constructive dialogue.125 While some
have written about recognition as laudable goal of political communication, Young
argues that it is in fact a condition that is necessary to establish prior to the substantive
communication itself.126
Second, Young advocates the use of rhetorical strategies in political dialogue.
This point is similar to much of what I have discussed above; Young sees a great
advantage to including emotional expression and other styles of communication that are
not traditionally accepted in deliberative theory in order to give voice to marginalized
groups. She also, however, makes an important claim regarding rhetoric and the
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audience toward whom it is directed. Rhetorical devices such as emotion, visual media,
irony, and metaphor allow the speaker to tailor her communication to a specific audience.
Gone from this picture of political dialogue are the disembodied, gender-less, and raceless participants. Instead, the speaker can attend carefully to the particular history,
idioms, and assumptions of the audience in a way that she cannot through argumentation
alone.127
Importantly, rhetorical moves also help bring issues to the political agenda that
might not be given proper attention otherwise. This mechanism for inclusion is yet
another example of the need for emotion in political communication. Young explains
that impassioned speech can be particularly important in drawing attention to claims
made by minority or marginalized groups.128 Emotional expression can lead participants
to reconsider the appropriate weight of an issue or argument and develop empathy
ZLWKRXWDQ\QHZSUHPLVHVRUUDWLRQDOHEHLQJDGYDQFHG,IZHUHFDOO%RKPDQ¶VDUJXPHQW
for a baseline ability to raise topics for public discussion, we can recognize that this
aspect of rhetoric is a crucial component of bringing oppressed groups and their claims
into the public conversation. Finally, rhetoric assists in the move from reason to
judgment. As discussed above, Damasio has demonstrated a neurological basis for the
need for emotion in decision-making. Rhetoric can help to provide such a push toward
making political determinations. In the process of communication, participants may be
SUHVHQWHGZLWKPXOWLSOHLQFRPSDWLEOHDQG\HWUHDVRQDEOHDUJXPHQWV³:KHQLWLVSRVVLEOH
WRDFFHSWVHYHUDOFODLPVRQUDWLRQDOJURXQGV´DUJXHV<RXQJ³UKHWRULFSURYLGHV
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contextual and motivational grounds for choosing between rationally acceptable
SRVLWLRQV´129
Third, Young argues for the use of narrative alongside other forms of political
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ7KLVSUDFWLFHLVYHU\VLPLODUWR6DQGHUV¶WHVWLmony that I discussed
above. Also mentioned above, in situations where the perspective of the dominant group
effectively excludes alternate perspectives from consideration, narrative can help to foster
understanding between groups with divergent perspectives. Young provides a detailed
description of how this practice can achieve such a goal. First, Young argues that a social
group that suffers a wrong often lacks the language to express their experience within the
prevailing discourse. Storytelling provides the means necessary to relate this kind of
experience to other groups.130 This practice allows oppressed groups to challenge the
language used in the dominant discourse to describe their experiences. Second, narrative
helps us to understand the experiences of individuals situated in social positions different
from our own. What argumentation lacks and storytelling provides is the acceptance and
encouragement of conveying emotional and social realities to other individuals or groups.
Moreover, narrative provides the opportunity to challenge and correct preconceptions and
biases ± a process necessary for effective communication.131 Finally, storytelling
HQODUJHVRXUWRWDOVRFLDONQRZOHGJH³6WRULHVQRWRQO\UHODWHWKHH[SHULHQFHVRIWKH
SURWDJRQLVWV´<RXQJZULWHV³EXWDOVRSUHVHQWDSDUWLFXODULQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHLU
UHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKRWKHUV´132 Listeners not only learn about the experiences of the
speakers, they also have the opportunity to develop their understandings of their own
                                                                                                                      
129

Ibid., 70.
Ibid., 72.
131
Ibid., 73-74.
132
Ibid., 76.
130

75
places in society and how they are perceived by other social groups. In other words,
QDUUDWLYHKHOSVWRSURYLGHDPRUHFRPSOHWHSLFWXUHRI:DOVK¶Vmetaphorical sphere.
While Sanders and Young have argued for the inclusion of emotion, others have
suggested that perhaps our political communication ± even deliberation ± already and
inevitably relies on emotion. The validity of such an assertion might suggest that the
types of reforms offered by Young and Sanders are unnecessary, as the goals that are the
reasons for their implementation can be satisfied through deliberation. Cheryl Hall, for
example, argues that we ought to do away with the reason/passion dichotomy
altogether.133 ,QDQDUJXPHQWVLPLODUWR'DPDVLR¶V+DOOH[SODLQVWKDWSDVVLRQLV
LQKHUHQWO\LQYROYHGLQPDNLQJSROLWLFDOFKRLFHV%HFDXVH³WKHYHU\SURFHVVRIVRUWLQJ
through options and making judgments about how to proceed draws on the capacity for
SDVVLRQ´ZHFDQQRWH[SHFWWRVHSDUDWHRXUHPRWLRQVIURPSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHVVXFKDV
deliberation.134 Rather than understanding rhetoric and emotion as auxiliaries to
argumentation, she asserts, we ought to integrate these ideas into our conceptions of
reason and deliberation. According to Hall, the way in which Sanders and Young cast
their arguments about testimony and narrative is not only unnecessary, but also
counterproductive in that they reinforce a false dichotomy that lends itself to the
denigration of emotion.135
Like the other authors above, Hall has good reason to question the sharp lines
between reason and emotion. However, I argue that she fails to recognize the danger in
assuming that traditional deliberation provides an appropriate environment for emotion to
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be fully utilized. In particular, the ability of emotion to foster empathy and provide
understanding across perspectives seems stifled in such a setting. Although passion
inevitably enters our decision-making processes, when the norm in deliberation is to
discourage the outward expression of emotion participants from marginalized groups may
have a difficult time adding their voices to the public conversation.
'HVSLWHP\FULWLFLVPRI+DOO¶VDUJXPHQW,GREHOLHYHWKDWKHUZRUNKDVLQD
certain respect, pointed deliberative theory in the right direction. By questioning the
dominant conception of deliberation, Hall opens the door to a wide range of possibilities.
For the remainder of this project, I will take this as an opportunity to attempt to work the
benefits of rhetoric and narrative into a more expansive understanding of deliberation.
While the suggestions Young and Sanders offer effectively address many of the concerns
that I have raised thus far in this project, the practices they advocate lack the
intersubjectivity offered by deliberation. In contrast to testimony or storytelling, the
substantive exchanges that take place in deliberative settings help to foster a sense of
FRRSHUDWLRQDQGLQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVV,QWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQ,ZLOOH[SORUH%RDO¶VIRUXP
theater and simultaneous dramaturgy as methods of political communication that improve
the empathetic benefits of the practices outlined by Young by retaining the higher level of
interaction between participants found in deliberation.
Theatre of the Oppressed as Deliberation
There is a type of communication that has been seldom engaged by theories of
deliberation and political communication, and that can improve our understanding of how
GHOLEHUDWLRQRXJKWWRZRUN%RDO¶V³VLPXOWDQHRXVGUDPDWXUJ\´DQG³IRUXPWKHDWHU´
discussed in his works Theatre of the Oppressed and Legislative Theatre, offer an
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alternative to strict argumentation and reason-giving that I argue fills a role that no aspect
of deliberative theory has yet filled. While Boal discusses a variety of theatrical methods
that may be employed by an oppressed group, I will focus on simultaneous dramaturgy
and forum theater because of their engagement with both deliberative concepts and the
communicative flexibility that Young and Sanders advocate.
As a native of Rio de Janeiro, Boal developed his philosophy and theatrical
methods within the context of extreme poverty, widespread violence, and extensive
organized crime and police corruption.136 One can easily see the influence of these
circumstances in the resulting approach that Boal takes toward politics. Faced with a
sociopolitical environment that was totally unresponsive to its poorest citizens, he
developed a system to give voice to those who experience constant oppression. Although
one might argue that methods developed in response to such extreme circumstances are
unnecessary in a more developed democracy such as the United States, this would be to
ignore the similarities between the two situations. Because there are still populations
within more developed democracies whose voices are shut out of the public conversation,
the differences are of degree, not kind.
There are two types of theater developed by Boal that we ought to include within
a broad conception of deliberation.137 In simultaneous dramaturgy, a group that has
identified a problem performs a short skit, either from a pre-prepared script or improvised
according to the topic at hand. The actors proceed up until the point where the problem
comes to a head. Here, the audience is asked to offer solutions to the problem, which are
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played out in turn by the actors, subject to intervention and correction by the audience
when they believe the actors are committing mistakes or fallacies. Each of these possible
solutions is discussed theatrically ± through both verbal and nonverbal elements ± on
stage, as well as by the audience members.138 This form of theater begins to blur the
distinction between actor and spectator. While the spectators remain separated from the
actors, a line of communication is opened that does not exist in traditional theater.
Moreover, Boal explains that the object interpreted by the actor changes, saying that
³>W@he actor ceases to interpret WKHLQGLYLGXDODQGVWDUWVWRLQWHUSUHWWKHJURXS´139 In this
process the stage transforms from a medium in which the perspective of one writer is
disseminated to an audience to one in which the actors interpret the collective voice of all
who choose to participate.
The interactive nature of simultaneous dramaturgy is an important step in
exploring new means of communication between actors and spectators. In forum theater,
Boal further blurs the lines between actors and spectators. Beginning in a similar manner
to simultaneous dramaturgy, the actors perform a short skit, including a problem and a
solution decided on by the actors either in real time or prior to the performance. Upon
conclusion of the skit, the audience members are asked whether or not they agree with the
solution. When a portion of the audience inevitably disagrees, the skit is performed once
again. However, in this next performance any member of the audience who wishes to
participate is given the opportunity to replace one of the actors. This individual then
WDNHVRQWKHUROHDFWHGRXWE\WKHSUHYLRXVDFWRUVWHSSLQJLQWRKHUQHZUROHDVD³spect-
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actor´140 One is limited, though, in the changes one can make to the scene; the new actor
must carry out the same activities that were being performed by her or his character, and
FDQQRWDUELWUDULO\FKDQJHWKHFKDUDFWHU¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHV141 Here, we can see the complete
demolition of the actor/spectator divide. The roles of the audience member, the writer,
and the actor are confused to the point that one-dimensional storytelling is replaced with
an exchange of ideas and perspectives through language, motion, and expression.
In both of these forms of theater, interaction between the audience or spect-actors
and the original actors is facilitated by an individual whom Boal refers to as the Joker.
The Joker does not add another voice to the discussion on stage. Rather, he or she
ensures the conditions for dialogue between the actors and the spect-actors, working to
create the reality in which those on stage will function.142 As I will discuss later on, this
IXQFWLRQLVYLWDOWR%RDO¶VPHWKRGVDVWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUSURGXFWLYHGHOLEHUDWLRQGRQRW
necessarily arise on their own in such a setting.
Many groups have emSOR\HG%RDO¶VPHWKRGVLQWKHLUFRPPXQLWLHVDQG
academicians of various disciplines have started to include his ideas in their studies.
However, little or no political theory has explored the potential for the Theatre of the
Oppressed to address the shortcomings of traditional deliberation. In fact, the Theatre of
the Oppressed has the potential to tackle many of the same problems that are addressed
E\<RXQJ¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYHGHPRFUDF\)LUVWWKHXVHRILQWHUDFWLYHWKHDWHUDVSROLWLFDO
communication provides opportunities to use rhetoric in a way that highlights the
experiences of a particular social group. Because the individuals who design the scenes
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have control over the material that the audience will engage after the performance, they
have an opportunity to focus the attention of all involved on their particular
understanding of a social problem. This focus is a necessary feature when the goal is the
development of empathy in order to include a previously ignored perspective.
Simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater not only incorporate the type of
communication necessary to convey alternate perspectives, but may also improve upon
this process as well. While narrative and storytelling provide an opportunity to focus on
the experiences of oppressed groups, the dominant group will not necessarily respond in
the way that Young and Sanders desire. As Walsh points out, there is no guarantee that
audience members will recognize the validity of these alternate viewpoints; they might
experience a narrative as threats to their way of life or attacks on their beliefs instead of
DQLQYLWDWLRQWREURDGHQWKHLUSHUVSHFWLYHV7KHVHLQGLYLGXDOVPD\³DWWHPSWWRUHFRQFLOH
LWZLWKGRPLQDQWPRGHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´QRWDFFHSWLWDVSDUWRIGHYHORSLQJDQHZ
understanding.143 Such a reception would hardly work to reduce internal exclusion.
%RDO¶VPHWKRGVKRZHYHUPD\KHOSWRRYHUFRPHWKLVREVWDFOH%HFDXVHWKH
audience members are encouraged to become active participants in the scenes unfolding
on stage, a narrative is less likely to be experienced as an attack and more likely to be
approached as a collective undertaking. This difference is not as much a result of any
altered motive on the part of the audience as it is a new requirement of those who are
crafting the scene to be played out on stage. When simply presenting a narrative, one
need not consider too strongly the way in which their message will be received. When
using the methods such as forum theater, however, Boal explains that:
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[I]t is important that the will exercised by the Protagonist ± the character who
will be replaced in the forum by the spect-actor ± is a desire which the intervening
spect-actors feel and will be ready to exert themselves to achieve since they must
enter into sym-pathetic relationship with him or her (they must share the same
emotions, desires, and ideas).144
Instead of narrating a perspective to an audience ± a method that could easily come
across as accusatory when dealing with difficult issues such as race and gender ± the
actors must invite the spect-actors to participate in the reshaping of their own
understandings. This form of interaction is certainly not necessary for the type of
everyday topics that often come up for deliberation. When divergent understandings of
society preclude a shared definition of the problem at hand, however, these perspectives
must be presented in a way that best encourages those in the dominant group to fully
consider their validity.
It is likely that I have not yet fully convinced my reader that we ought to
understand simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater as properly deliberative practices.
If we remember that deliberation is premised on the exchange of reasons acceptable to
all, however, then the discussion above of blurring the lines between reason and emotion
ought to open the door for a broader understanding of what should count as deliberation.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson ± two theorists situated squarely within
mainstream deliberative theory ± in fact come close to making a case for a more
expansive conception of deliberation. In a point of concurrence with their critics, they
state that rhetoric and emotion are valid and important means of political communication,
and that they need not always stand in opposition to each other.145 While this certainly
goes a long way toward a more inclusive theory of deliberation, Gutmann and Thompson
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still fail to recognize that their claim leads logically to the inclusion of other forms of
communication within a concept of deliberation. They write that when alternate forms of
SROLWLFV³DUHQHFHVVDU\WRDFKLHYHGHOLEHUDWLYHHQGVGHOLEHUDWLYHWKHRU\FRQVLVWHQWO\
VXVSHQGVLWVUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUGHOLEHUDWLRQ´146 However, I argue that we need not
consider all other forms of communication besides reason-giving to be non-deliberative.
Similarly, Bohman writes that tactics such as irony, metaphor, and narrative are
VRPHWLPHVQHFHVVDU\ZKHQWKH³FDSDFLW\IRUSHUVSHFWLYH-WDNLQJ´LVREVWUXFWHGLQ
deliberation.147 Bohman sees these methods as non-deliberative means to restore
deliberative conditions. Instead of arguing that we must suspend deliberative
requirements at times, however, we ought to understand forms of communication such as
simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater to be truly deliberative in nature.
In support of this argument, I show here that the practice of forum theater satisfies
HDFKRI*XWPDQQDQG7KRPSVRQ¶VIRXUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\RXWOLQHG
in the first chapter. First, simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater embody the public
exchange of reason that is the cornerstone of deliberative theory. While these methods
do not rely on the argumentation that has traditionally characterized deliberation, the
discussion above should provide a sufficient foundation for the claim that deliberating on
stage is no less rational than deliberating across a table. This type of community theater
is by no means a substitute for the type of straightforward deliberation that is most often
associated with the term; however, it can certainly be a valuable addition to the means by
which citizens exchange information and judgments about that information.
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Secondly, including forum theater in the scope of deliberation enhances the
qualities of publicity and accessibility that are vital to democratic legitimacy.
Simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater, after all, are designed for implementation in
public spaces, not behind closed doors. More importantly, these methods add to options
available for participants to convey information and perspective. Limiting the modes of
communication to those accepted by traditional deliberative theory decreases
accessibility for those who are not comfortable or proficient in this type of speaking,
while broadening the scope of acceptable communication allows for a greater portion of
the population to participate in a way in which they feel efficacious.
Thirdly, deliberation must lead to some binding, enforceable political decisions.
There are myriad ways in which simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater might be
incorporated into this process; for instance, opportunities for community groups to voice
their concerns through forum theater might be formally written into the procedures of a
policy-making deliberative body. In addition to using these methods as part of the public
conversation, Boal both advocates and has applied them to the formal process of
legislation in a process he calls legislative theater. Here, instead of depicting a mode or
instance of oppression, a group of practitioners uses forum theater to introduce a
proposed law, thereby extending the communicative utility of forum theater into the
lawmaking process.148 As a legislator in Rio de Janeiro, Boal successfully used this
method to craft a number of laws. For example, the legislative body there passed a law
through this method requiring raised curbs around hanging garbage bins to alert the blind
to the presence of these receptacles.149
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This application of forum theater is undoubtedly useful for successful legislation.
However, we ought to be careful to maintain a separate space for communities to foster
empathy for oppressed groups. While legislative theater is an effective way to
demonstrate and consider the implications of a certain policy, its focus is likely to be too
narrow to allow non-oppressed individuals to fully appreciate the experiences and
perspectives of subordinated groups. This understanding instead requires communication
that centers on an oppressed group, not on a specific piece of legislation. In other words,
legislative theater can lead to more effective and legitimate lawmaking regarding
remedies to oppression, but requires the prior development of empathy through
communication outside of legislation.
Finally, it should be clear by this point that broadening our conception of
deliberation to include forum theater helps to create a more free and equal public
dialogue. As alternative forms of communication allow a broader range of voices and
issues to enter into the public discussion, they enhance the democratic legitimacy of any
regime that purports to represent the needs of all of its citizens. Certainly we should not
expect this or any single innovation in the way we conceive of deliberation to bring about
perfect inclusion; indeed, we must give more thought to issues such as how to ensure
adequate resources for all so that they may devote the necessary time to public
engagement. To the extent that innovative communicative practices reduce internal
exclusion and the influence of unequal social relationships, however, their adoption
constitutes an improvement to political deliberation.
$V,PHQWLRQHGDERYH%RDO¶VPHWKRGVFDQQRWRQO\KHOSWRDFKLHYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
across perspectives through encouraging emotional interaction; they may also help to
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retain the interaction between participants that is so central to deliberation. Although the
methods advocated by Young and Sanders effectively incorporate passion into the
political process, they do so at the expense of the intersubjective exchanges that
characterize deliberative democracy. It is because of a similar unidirectional movement
that Boal suggests that traditional theater may not be an appropriate medium for the
communication of an alternate, oppressed perspective. He asserts that when one simply
views a dramatic scene in the role of an audience member ± or, I argue here, when one
passively listens to a story or narrative ± the spectator ceases to be a subject. In this
FRQWH[W%RDOGHILQHVHPSDWK\DV³WKHHPRWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSZKLFKis established
between the character and spectator and which provokes, fundamentally, a delegation of
power on the part of the spectator, who becomes an object in relation to the character:
whatever happens to the latter, happens vicariously to the spectatRU´150 While this type
of empathy allows a spectator to see a social problem from the perspective of another
individual, it becomes more difficult for the spectator to see her own subjective place
within this scene. More specifically relevant to my overall project is that this type of
theater may communicate oppressed perspectives, but fails to create an understanding of
RQH¶VSODFHZLWKLQWKHVRFLDOSUREOHP:KHQWKLVLVWKHFDVHWKHUHVXOWLV³WKHVSHFWDWRU¶V
SXUJLQJRIKLV>VLF@VRFLDOVLQ´151 instead of the spectator coming to understand his or her
UROHLQWKDW³VRFLDOVLQ´
8VLQJ%RDO¶VPHWKRGRIIRUXPWKHDWHUKRZHYHUDQRSSUHVVHGJURXSPD\IRVWHU
empathy in a way that also produces greater understanding between them and other social
groups. Because spect-actors retain their status as subjects, they are able to actively
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participate in the exchange of information on stage, which in turn provides an opportunity
to see their roles within the social problem. Here, Boal reclaims empathy, not as a
passivHVXEPLVVLRQWRDQDUUDWLYHEXW³ZLWKLQDQHZV\VWHPWKDWZLOOLQFRUSRUDWHLWDQG
PDNHLWSHUIRUPDFRPSDWLEOHIXQFWLRQ´152 To place this distinction within the context of
my current project, the modes of communication discussed by Young and Sanders foster
empathy; however, this is a passive kind of empathy. Empathy that allows subjects to
place themselves within the appropriate context and sufficiently motivates them to action
must be the result of successful deliberation, not passive listening. Moreover, this subject
role allows spect-actors to give feedback, present their own ideas, and challenge
assumptions of those who constructed the original narrative. This difference from
traditional political theater LVZKDWPDNHV%RDO¶VPHWKRGVWUXO\GHOLEHUDWLve: the
opportunity for all participants to provide input, debate the actions taken on stage, and
shape the course of public discussion.
Additionally, forum theater has the added advantage of forcing the spect-actors to
take actions to support their positions. While traditional deliberation secures
intersubjectivity, it also allows participants to take and defend a position without any
experience actually implementing what follows from these positions. By contrast, when
a spect-actor must physically act out a suggestion in relationships with the other actors on
VWDJH³KH>VLF@RIWHQUHDOLVHVWKDWWKLQJVDUHQRWVRHDV\ZKHQKHKLPVHOIKDVWRSUDFWLVH
ZKDWKHVXJJHVWV´153 Of course, interaction on stage is no substitute for the concrete
experiences that follow the deliberative stage; however, this interaction during
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deliberation is an especially vital component when dealing with issues that affect
oppressed groups ± groups whose perspectives are often more difficult to adopt.
In Chapter II, I drew on Ange-0DULH+DQFRFN¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWZHPXVWIRFXVRQ
individual experiences in order to give voice to oppressed groups. When we see a person
through the filter of our preconceptions of a social group ± an involuntary process that
human cognition makes inevitable ± we distort the perspective of that speaker. The
ability to focus on the experiences of an individual is undoubtedly one of the goals of
testimony and narrative; by allowing an individual to recount her personal experiences
without concern for the strict rules of deliberative argumentation, the audience is able to
see how her experiences fit into the overall structure of society.
Forum theater, however, has a distinct advantage over narrative in this regard. In
addition to allowing the spect-actors to more easily understand their role within a
political or social context, the intersubjectivity of forum theater helps to actively combat
the stereotypes than prevent full consideration of a non-dominant perspective. When an
audience member takes the stage to interact with an actor who has just presented a
particular narrative through a scene, this spect-actor is forced to use his or her
interactions with that character in addition to (if not in place of ) preconceptions and
stereotypes to make political judgments. Or, even better, if a spect-actor takes the place
of the individual about whom they have these preconceptions, this provides an
RSSRUWXQLW\WRDWOHDVWIRUWKHPRPHQWVWHSLQVLGHWKDWLQGLYLGXDO¶VVKRHV$VWKLV
requires adopting the social position of that character on stage, it is a useful tool for
FRPEDWWLQJWKHSUHMXGLFHVRQHPLJKWKDYHDERXWWKHFKDUDFWHU¶VVRFLDOJURup. In this way,
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the stereotypical beliefs held by the dominant group lose some of their power over the
transmission of understanding across social groups.
Individual experiences ought not to be considered isolated from the greater
sociopolitical context, however. We should always take care to connect these
experiences back to a larger issue, to use them as sources of information to make
decisions about what constitutes a fair and just political outcome. Here, one might object
that such an approach erroneously assumes similarities among members of a certain
social group; in other words, one might argue that it is dangerous to try to obtain
information about a monolithic black or female experience based on the narrative of one
person or theatrical collective. Indeed, it is both logical and necessary to reject the idea
that any one voice can fully represent the needs and concerns of any social group.
However, this objection unfairly characterizes the type of project in which I am engaging
here. The objective is not to find the individual whose experiences most accurately
represent the perspective of a particular demographic. Rather, through the inclusion of a
series of personal narratives that are explored and shared by a community as a whole
through BRDO¶VPHWKRGVHDFKLQGLYLGXDOH[SHULHQFHFDQKHOSXVWRSLHFHWRJHWKHUD
collective understanding of social and political problems. As a group collectively relays
a narrative on stage, it shines light on a particular facet of our society.
Potential Objections to Deliberative Theater
In this final section, I aim to address a few potential objections to the use of
%RDO¶VWKHDWULFDOPHWKRGVDVGHOLEHUDWLRQ2EMHFWLRQVWRWKHWKHDWHULWVHOIDUHRIFRXUVH
much older than forum theater. In one of his lesser-known works, /HWWHUWR'¶$OHPEHUW

on the Theatre, Rousseau lays out a number of objections to theater in general. For one,

89
Rousseau claims that the theater is incapable of promoting anything but the prevailing
public opinion:
The stage is, in general, a painting of the human passions, the original of which is
in every heart. But if the painter neglected to flatter these passions, the spectators
would soon be repelled and would not want to see themselves in a light which
made them despise themselves. So that, if he gives an odious coloring to some
passions, it is only to those that are not general and are naturally hated. Hence the
author, in this respect, only follows public sentiment.154
At best, the theater will reaffirm what good morals the audience may have. At its worst,
however, the theater can exacerbate the more dangerous passions inherent in our nature.
Rousseau points to the comedies of Molière as an example of this hazard: ³VLQFHWKHYHU\
pleasure of the comic LVIRXQGHGRQDYLFHRIWKHKXPDQKHDUW´KHDUJXHV³LWLVD
consequence of this principle that the more the comedy is amusing and perfect, the more
LWVHIIHFWLVGLVDVWURXVIRUPRUDOV´155 By painting light-heartedly what Rousseau views as
immoral, Molière makes his audience believe that they should follow their more
destructive passions at the expense of their positive ones.
It may seem pointless DWILUVWWRFRPSDUH5RXVVHDX¶VYLHZVWR%RDODVWKHWZR
have vastly different goals; Boal seeks a revision of the social order, while Rousseau
wants to maintain morality in Geneva. Additionally, Rousseau writes about theater for
the purposes of entertainment, in contrast to a theater whose end is conscious political
change. Showing why RousseaX¶VFULWLTXHKDs no bearing on simultaneous dramaturgy
and forum theater, however, can further illuminate the democratic value of these
methods. The crux of this lies in the very different ways the two types of theater reflect
an image of the audience back to them. The type of theater that Rousseau rejects ±
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which, as it happens, is also rejected by Boal insofar as it is not politically useful ± shows
the audience an image of itself that it desires to see. By contrast, forum theater provides
an image of society that reflects not the dominant views, but the oppression that is often
unseen by the majority. Additionally, the spectators (or spect-actors) are then able to
participate in rethinking approaches to the problem presented on stage. In this way, the
theater about which Boal writes lacks the moral risks that Rousseau fears.
Interestingly, Rousseau also offers a suggestion that may improve the utility of
simultaneous dramaturgy and forum theater. Instead of attending the theater for
entertainment, Rousseau suggests attending events such as public festivals. Much the
same way Boal urges spectators to reclaim their status as subjects, Rousseau suggests that
ZH³OHWWKHVSHFWDWRUVEHFRPHDQHQWHUWDLQPHQWWRWKHPVHOYHVPDNHWKHPDFWRUV
themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself [sic] in the others so that all will be
EHWWHUXQLWHG´156 Perhaps a gathering of this kind prior to theatrical events would help to
foster ties between the oppressed and the oppressors ± ties that would be of real value
once the deliberative process begins.
$QRWKHUSRVVLEOHREMHFWLRQWRZDUGWKHXVHRI%RDO¶VPHWKRGVDVDPHDQVRI
democratic political communication is the fact that his personal politics can easily be
interpreted as anti-democratic. At times Boal seems to advocate non-democratic means
WRDFKLHYLQJEHWWHUFLUFXPVWDQFHVIRURSSUHVVHGJURXSV+HVWDWHVWKDW³WKHWKHDWHULVQRW
UHYROXWLRQDU\LQLWVHOIEXWLWLVVXUHO\DUHKHDUVDOIRUWKHUHYROXWLRQ´157 Such language
admittedly seems directly opposed to any theory of democracy. However, we ought to be
able to embrace the communicative properties inherent in simultaneous dramaturgy and
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IRUXPWKHDWHUZLWKRXWDGRSWLQJ%RDO¶VSROLWLFDOJRDOV,QVRIDUDVWKHPHWKRGVRXWOLQHGLQ

Theatre of the Oppressed are empathy-creating and consciousness-raising activities, they
can be utilized to promote a more inclusive democracy.
Failed DWWHPSWVDWDSSO\LQJ%RDO¶VPHWKRGVWRDFWXDOSROLWLFDOREVWDFOHVPD\DOVR
fuel skepticism of the ability of these practices to effectively give voice to oppressed
groups. It is possible that, despite the best intents of the participants, unequal social
relationships may work their way into forum theater in the same way that they appear in
traditional deliberation. Sonia Hamel provides one such example in her account of the
use of forum theater to attempt to initiate a public dialogue about homelessness in
Montreal. Hamel and others, including several homeless individuals, participated in a
series of forum theater workshops that led up to a public event, which the community at
large was invited to attend.158 The scenes that this group created were largely centered on
WKHLQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHKRPHOHVVSRSXODWLRQ WKHRSSUHVVHG DQGWKHFLW\¶VSROLFH
force (the oppressors); additionally, these scenes addressed experiences such as
interactions between the homeless and non-profit organizations, drug dealing, and
conflicts with local businesses. The purpose of this event was to give voice to the
KRPHOHVV³E\IRFXVLQJRQtheir narratives of oppression as visLEOHµFRORQLVHUV¶RISXEOLF
VSDFHLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDSULYDWHVSDFHWRFDOOWKHLURZQ´159 In other words, the
organizers shared the goal of conveying an oppressed perspective that more conventional
political communication had thus far excluded.
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6RQLD+DPHO³:KHQWKHDWUHRIWKHRSSUHVVHGEHFRPHVWKHDWUHRIWKHRSSUHVVRU´ Research in Drama
Education: The Journal of Applied Theatre and Performance 18 (2013): 403-416. It is worth noting that
+DPHOXVHVWKHWHUP³GHOLEHUDWLYHWKHDWUH´WRGHVFULEHWKHSUDFWLFHVVKHGHVFULEHVLQKHUDUWLFOH:KLOHVKH
does not argue for a theoretical reconceptualization of deliberation in the way that I am here, this feature
nonetheless demonstrates the view that forum theater may be considered a form of legitimate public
discourse.
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Ibid., 404.
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However, despite the best intentions of those who put together this event, the
dominant narratives of the event belonged not to the homeless, but to virtually all other
subsections of the Montreal population. Although they were well-represented within the
group putting on the play, the organizers failed to attract a single homeless spect-actor; as
a result, when members of the audience invalidated the narratives presented in the scenes
on stage, there was no countervailing force from the audience. Additionally, very few
audience members actually chose to step on stage into the shoes of the homeless
protagonists, instead opting only to engage the Joker.160 In short, what was intended to
be an opportunity to add a new voice to the public conversation functioned instead as a
space in which non-homeless citizens reaffirmed the dominant narratives of an oppressed
group without this additional perspective.
:KLOH+DPHO¶VREVHUYDWLRQVSURYLGHDXVHIXOFDXWLRQDJDLQVWWKHSLWIDOOVRI
deliberative theater, we should by no means conclude from the account she provides that
forum theater inevitably maintains social relationships of power. We ought to instead
recognize this as an illustration of the importance of providing a public space for an
oppressed group to specifically provide its own narrative of its oppression. Although this
forum theater event was meant to serve this exact purpose, it actually devolved largely
into a space for the oppressor group to reiterate its own narrative; instead of an
opportunity for the homeless to express their unique collective perspective on their
situation, this event merely served as a confirmation of certain perspectives from outside
of that group.
There are, then, two lessons we ought to draw from this experience. First, we
ought to notice how easily this process took place. Nobody forced this transition ± it
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occurred almost organically. It is worth highlighting the fact that, although we certainly
cannot know the intentions of those who provided the narratives during the event, no
malicious motives were required to perpetuate the oppressive relationships found in the
city of Montreal. Rather, these relationships seem to maintain themselves unless
deliberate and careful corrective action is taken. Second, it is vital to the deliberative
success of this type of event to follow at least %RDO¶VJHQHUDOSUHVFULSWLRQVLIQRWKLV
H[DFWRXWOLQH7KLVHYHQWZDVQRWDGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIWKHIDLOXUHRI%RDO¶VPHWKRGVRURI
the application of these methods to a theory of deliberation, but simply of the organizers
of this event to create the necessary conditions for the homeless population to convey its
collective perspective. A particularly undermining shortcoming of this event was the
failure of the Joker to coordinate substantial spect-actor participation following the
scenes. As this step is the uniquely deliberative component of forum theater, it should
FRPHDVQRVXUSULVHWKDWLWVH[FOXVLRQOHGDOVRWRWKHH[FOXVLRQRIWKHRSSUHVVHGJURXS¶V
understanding of the issues at hand. Those VHHNLQJWRXVH%RDO¶VWKHDWHUIRUD
deliberative purpose can draw important lessons from mistakes such as these.
Conclusion
In this project, I hope to have contributed to a body of literature that seeks to
make democratic deliberation as inclusive as possible. In Chapter I, I have reviewed
SULRUFULWLFLVPVRIGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\DQGHODERUDWHGXSRQ+DEHUPDV¶WKHRU\RI
systematically distorted communication. In the second and third chapters, I have
explored the ways in which deliberation is undermined by personal perceptions and gaps
in understanding resulting from distorted communication.
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Following Iris Marion Young, I have argued in Chapter IV that in order to remedy
these issues we must consider a variety of forms of communication to promote intergroup
empathy. Departing from her work, however, I assert that we need not abandon the
ideals of deliberation. Rather, we ought to alter and expand our understanding of what
constitutes proper deliberation. Although I have presenting numerous objections to
deliberation in this piece, they are largely surmountable. Through the methods laid out
by Boal, I have argued that deliberative theory can both retain its central tenets while
claiming the benefits of the reforms offered by Sanders and Young. There are
undoubtedly improvements to be made upon the suggestions that I have made; however, I
am glad to have been able to at least bring Boal into the conversation of democratic
political theory, as his ideas have great potential to improve inclusion within our own
society.
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